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INTRODUCTIONIN APRIL 2000, an Air Philippines flight from Manila to Davao
International Airport crashed into a hillside while trying to
land, killing all on board. Although a commission appointed by
the President of the Philippines determined that pilot error
caused the crash, plaintiffs representing the passengers' families
filed suit in August 2000 in an Illinois state court against AAR
Parts Trading, Inc. (formerly known as AAR Aircraft & Engine
Group, Inc.), the lessor that leased the aircraft to Air Philippines
prior to the crash, and Fleet Business Credit, LLC, the lessor at
the time of the crash. The case, Layug v. AAR, moved slowly
through the Illinois state court system until 2008. In 2008, fol-
lowing various motions, amendments, and plaintiff-favorable
rulings, Air Philippines' insurers, who were handling the case
under various insurance and indemnity provisions in the lease
documentation, settled the case for $165 million.
While the Layug court made a number of plaintiff-favorable
rulings, one of the more important decisions that apparently
motivated the insurers to settle was a rejection of the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss based on 49 U.S.C. § 44112.1 The de-
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fendants based their motion on the plain language of § 44112,
which states, in pertinent part, that "a lessor . .. is liable for
personal injury ... only when a civil aircraft. . . is in the actual
possession or control of the lessor .... ,,2 Despite the plain lan-
guage of § 44112, the Layug court ruled that § 44112 did not
preempt the plaintiffs' state-law tort claims, allowing the case to
proceed.'
Section 44112 and its predecessor statutes have been effective
law since 1948 and aircraft lessors have long relied on the pro-
tection provided thereby. Not surprisingly, the ruling by the
Layug court and subsequent settlement by the insurers caused
the aviation finance community to question the continuing effi-
cacy of § 44112. A number of courts have issued well-reasoned
decisions holding that § 44112 preempts state-law claims and
such decisions remain effective law in many jurisdictions, but
unfortunately, the Layug court is not the only court that has
held that § 44112 does not preempt state-law claims. In fact,
Layug is only one of the most recent in a series of cases and
decisions that evidence that the language of § 44112, while
seemingly clear, actually is sufficiently unclear as to create a vari-
ety of divergent court holdings that, when collectively evaluated,
threaten to undermine § 44112 and the protections it purports
to provide.
Given the key role that aviation plays in the global economy
and that aviation finance plays in providing operators with effec-
tive access to aircraft, it is worthwhile to evaluate the issues
presented by the current state of case law interpreting § 44112. 4
Moreover, given the uncertainty created by the divergent case
law and the need, as stated by Congress in 1948, "to encourage
[owners and lessors] to participate in the financing of aircraft
purchases," it is worthwhile to evaluate how to amend § 44112 to
rectify the potential problems caused by the divergent case law
and allow § 44112 to provide the protections originally intended
by Congress.
Part I of this article will examine the procedural history of the
Layug case to determine why the defendants' insurers may have
chosen to settle the case before trial, as well as the Layug court's
reasoning in finding that § 44112 did not exculpate the lessor
2 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) (2006).
3 See case discussion infra Part I.A.
4 In 2006, 53% of the global fleet was operated under some form of leasing




defendants. Part II will dissect the case law beyond Layug on this
subject, noting and evaluating the courts' struggles with the two
separate issues of (1) whether § 44112 preempts state law, the
issue in the Layug case, and (2) whether § 44112 covers lessors,
which has been at issue in other cases. Part III of this article will
analyze § 44112 and Congress's intent behind enacting it by ex-
amining the legislative history of § 44112 and its predecessor
statutes. This analysis will demonstrate Congress's intention
both to preempt state-law claims and to include lessors within
the coverage of the statute. Part IV gives an overview of the cur-
rent finance market in commercial aviation, including the devel-
opment of operating leases, to demonstrate that, given
Congress's intent in enacting § 44112 and its predecessor stat-
utes, today's operating lessors should be covered by the statute.5
Finally, Part V explores the possibility of amending § 44112 to
correct the current discrepancies in its application and to elimi-
nate the risk of continued divergent holdings and the resulting
uncertainty in the aviation finance marketplace.
I. THE AIR PHILIPPINES CASE AND ITS AFTERMATH
This Part will analyze the procedural history of Layug. This
analysis will highlight a number of issues with the Layug court's
holdings, in particular with respect to preemption under
§ 44112. This Part will also evaluate some of the repercussions
of Layug, including inaccurate public statements and subse-
quent litigation.
A. LAYUG v. AAR
On April 19, 2000, Air Philippines Flight 541 crashed into a
coconut grove on the hills of Samal Island in the Republic of the
Philippines.' Just before the crash, the pilot contacted the con-
5 As will also be discussed in Part IV, an "operating lease" is one of many ways
to categorize different types of leasing structures. At the time the relevant statute
was enacted, most leases were used as part of a long-term financing arrangement,
much like a loan (sometimes no different from a loan). Today, the leasing indus-
try has evolved to provide for the operating lease, which allows for the shorter-
term use of an aircraft. Unlike the leases used for long-term financing, the
equipment has enough useful life at the end of the lease term to be re-leased to
another lessee. See discussion infra Part III.B.
6 Kathy Marks & Konrad Muller, Philippines' Worst Air Crash Kills All 131 on
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trol tower to report visibility problems. 7 At the time of the
crash, the pilot was making a second attempt to land.' Everyone
on the flight, including 7 crew members and 124 passengers,
died in the crash.9 The President of the Philippines appointed
an independent investigation commission to investigate the
crash.'" The commission concluded that the crash was caused
by pilot error, noting the pilot's loss of situational awareness and
specifically finding no evidence of structural or mechanical
failure."
The aircraft, a Boeing 737, was manufactured in 1978 and op-
erated by Southwest Airlines for twenty years.1 2 AAR Parts Trad-
ing, Inc. (AAR) purchased the plane in 1998.13 After the
Federal Aviation Administration determined that the plane was
sound enough to export by issuing an export certificate of air-
worthiness and the Philippines aviation authority found that the
aircraft was airworthy under all applicable airworthiness regula-
tions, AAR leased the plane to Air Philippines.' 4 Later, AAR
sold the aircraft and assigned its rights, title, and interests in the
lease to Fleet Business Credit, LLC (Fleet) (AAR and Fleet are
collectively referred to as the "Layug Defendants"). 5 Because
AAR had transferred the aircraft to Fleet, AAR had no interest
in the aircraft at the time of the crash.
In August 2000,Jovy Layug, the daughter of a Philippines resi-
dent who died in the crash, filed a complaint against AAR in
Cook County, Illinois, where AAR is headquartered. 6 The
plaintiff later amended the complaint to include Fleet as a de-
7 Air Philippines Flight Data and Voice Data Recorders Found, AIRLINE INDUSTRY IN-
FORMATION, Apr. 20, 2000, http://www.allbusiness.com/operations/shipping-air-
freight/508301-1.html.
8 Marks & Muller, supra note 6.
9 Id.
10 AAR Responds to Inquiries Concerning Settlement of Air Philippines Accident Law-
suit, REUTERS, Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS
253669+13-Mar-2008+PRN20080313.
11 Id.
12 David Koenig, Insurers Settle Lawsuits over Philippines Crash for $165M, INSUR-
ANCE JOURNAL, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/na-
tional/2008/03/19/88380.htm.
13 AAR Responds to Inquiries Concerning Settlement of Air Philippines Accident Law-
suit, supra note 10.
14 Id.
15 Ellis v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 726, 729-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
16 Op. Modified on Denial of Reh'g, Layug v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc., No. 00
L 9599 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 6, 2005).
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fendant. 7 The initial complaint was based in product liability
and alleged, among other things, that the plane (i) lacked cur-
rent operation and maintenance manuals; (ii) was older than its
safe-life expectancy; (iii) was comprised of fatigued, cracked,
and corroded structures that would likely lead to the aircraft's
failure; and (iv) contained a fatigued flap control system that
was likely to fail. 18 The plaintiff alleged that these defective and
unreasonably dangerous conditions were the direct and proxi-
mate cause of the crash.'" The plaintiff also amended the com-
plaint several times over the years to add counts based on
negligence, breach of warranty, strict product liability, and com-
mon law bailment.2 ° The fourth amended complaint filed in
August 2002 joined thirty-two plaintiffs, representing fifty-three
decedents. 21
In September 2002, the Layug Defendants filed ajoint motion
to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted
under 49 U.S.C. § 44112.22 The motion noted that Congress en-
acted § 44112 to "protect from liability those who leased aircraft
without asserting control over or maintaining possession of a
leased aircraft. ' 23 As part of their motion, the Layug Defendants
attempted to distinguish their circumstances from a previous Il-
linois decision (Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney) that held a lessor lia-





20 The original complaint was filed on August 2, 2000, containing the product
liability cause of action above. A month later, it was amended to add Count II
based upon negligence and Count III for breach of warranty. In February 2001,
plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, adding an allegation that she had
been appointed administrator of the decedent's estate. In March 2002, plaintiff
filed a third amended complaint including eight new counts: negligent entrust-
ment, Count I (wrongful death) and Count II (survival action); strict product
liability, Count III (wrongful death) and Count IV (survival action); Illinois com-
mon law of bailment, Count V (wrongful death) and Count VI (survival action);
breach of warranty, Count IX (wrongful death) and Count X (survival action);
and spoliation of evidence, Count XI (damages). One month later, Layug filed a
fourth amended complaint joining thirty-two new plaintiffs. Finally, on August
15, 2002, plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint adding allegations to Counts
III and IV, Count V, and Count XI.
21 Op. Modified on Denial of Reh'g, Layug, No. 00 L 9599.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 723 N.E.2d 345, 352-53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
2009] 849
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
In Retzler, the defendant lessor, AMR Leasing Corporation,
was leasing the aircraft to Simmons Airlines, a sister corpora-
tion.25 This sister corporation was the parent of the operator,
American Eagle.26 Thus, because the operator and the defen-
dant lessor were corporate subsidiaries, the lessor arguably had
control over the operator and consequently the aircraft. The
Layug Defendants argued that the lease between AAR and Air
Philippines had no such characteristics.27 In other words, there
was no common ownership or other corporate link between
AAR and Air Philippines that could cause the Layug Defendants
to be in possession or control of the aircraft. Thus, according to
§ 44112, which requires "actual possession or control" to impose
liability on a lessor,28 the Layug Defendants should not have
been held liable.
The Layug court did not consider these distinctions under
§ 44112, instead finding Retzler to be appropriate and applicable
precedent.29 In fact, the court held that the element of control
over the aircraft was irrelevant, stating that the "Defendants' ar-
gument with regard to the issue of control of the aircraft is with-
out merit as that was a distinction that had no bearing on the
issue of preemption in the applicable case law."3 Obviously,
this holding is in direct opposition to the plain language of
§ 44112. As addressed in detail in Part II, the holding also mis-
interprets Retzler, which itself is flawed in numerous respects.3 1
25 Id. at 349. A 1998 Seventh Circuit case explains that both Simmons Airlines,
Inc. and American Airlines, Inc. were owned at the time by AMR Corporation.
Frederick v. Simmons Airlines, 144 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 1998).
26 Retz/er; 723 N.E.2d at 349.
27 Op. Modified on Denial of Reh'g, Layug, No. 00 L 9599.
28 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) (2006).
29 Op. Modified on Denial of Reh'g, Layug, No. 00 L 9599.
30 Id.
3' In addition to a questionable interpretation of § 44112, a subsequent Layug
court order demonstrates the court's lack of understanding of aircraft transac-
tions and leasing structures. In an order on the plaintiffs' motion to compel
discovery, the court held that a power of attorney provision in the lease demon-
strated that the Layug Defendants had control over Air Philippines. The provi-
sion read as follows:
(a) [Lessee] IRREVOCABLY APPOINTS LESSOR its true and law-
ful attorney to execute and to do and perform upon its behalf and
in its name or otherwise to deliver any documents, instruments or
certificates with such amendments thereto (if any), which Lessor
determines may be required and to take such steps as may be neces-




Faced with a pending trial in front of ajudge who determined
that (1) § 44112 does not preempt state law, (2) the amount of
control the Layug Defendants did or did not have over the air-
craft was irrelevant to § 44112's application, and (3) the Layug
Defendants controlled Air Philippines by way of an insurance
power of attorney, the insurers settled the case.32 Thus, in
March 2008, prior to conclusion of discovery and well before a
trial on the merits of the case and plaintiffs' claims, Air Philip-
pines' insurers negotiated and agreed on a settlement with the
plaintiffs' attorneys.3 However, this is not the way the case has
been presented by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
B. LAYUG's AFrERMATH
Throughout the Layug case proceedings, and particularly af-
ter the settlement, the plaintiffs' attorneys issued a series of
press releases and comments that one might conclude misrepre-
sent the status of the case, the validity of the plaintiffs' claims,
and the reasons for the settlement. The plaintiffs' attorneys
made the case about leasing a "decrepit airplane" and lessor re-
sponsibility for ensuring that airlines have "the latest equip-
ment" and "best maintenance. ' 34 For example, following the
Layug court's rejection of the Layug Defendants' motion to dis-
miss on the grounds that the case should have been heard in the
Philippines, the plaintiffs' attorneys issued a statement saying:
(c) agrees that this Power of Attorney shall be effective immedi-
ately (but Lessor shall not exercise any rights hereunder unless and
until an Event of Default (under and as defined in the Lease) shall
have occurred and be continuing ....
Order Granting Pl.'s Mot. to Compel Disc. from Defs., Layug v. AAR Aircraft &
Engine Group, Inc., No. 05 L 125509 at 1-2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2007). Provi-
sions of this nature are common in the industry but do not have the meaning or
importance which the Layug court found. Effectively, this provision gives the les-
sor the right to act on behalf of the lessee only in very limited circumstances.
The lessor is permitted to exercise the power of attorney only to process and
pursue insurance claims during periods when the lessor is in default of its obliga-
tions under the lease. As will be addressed in Part IV, lessors generally exercise
very little or no control over an aircraft while the aircraft is leased to an airline.
These types of provisions are not meant to give the lessor control over the aircraft
or lessee, but rather to give the lessor the ability to handle insurance matters
when the lessee is in default.
32 Koenig, supra note 12.
33 Id.
34 American Leasing Companies Pay $165 Million to Settle Philippines Crash,
REUTERS, Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressrelease/idus195
668+1 0-mar-2008+prn200803 10.
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With the possibility now of a full blown trial, AAR and Fleet who
leased the sub-standard planes should be made to understand
that when they did business with Air Philippines what they re-
ceived was good Philippine money. They should have consid-
ered their corporate responsibility informing their clients of the
true state of the machines or had at least provided their client an
expert examining the plane's true worth."
Another plaintiffs' attorney is quoted as saying that AAR "did
some cosmetic work, didn't do a (heavy maintenance) 'D' check
• . . and shipped [the plane] out to the Philippines" and that
lessors "are in the business of providing cheap aircraft to
lease."3 6 These statements appear contrary to the facts. The
cause of the crash was not attributed to the age or condition of
the aircraft but to the pilot's unfortunate mistake in poor
weather conditions and a loss of situational awareness on the
pilot's second landing attempt. Furthermore, prior to deliver-
ing the aircraft to the airline, the FAA issued an export certifi-
cate of airworthiness and the Philippines aviation authority
determined that the aircraft satisfied all applicable Philippine
airworthiness requirements. 7
While the plaintiffs' attorneys' statements poorly represent
the outcome of the case, the real danger created by such state-
ments is the potential damage they can cause to the aviation
finance industry as a whole. Reading these comments could
lead courts, as well as others unfamiliar with the aviation finance
industry, to several false conclusions. First among these is that
aircraft of a certain age cannot be safely operated. It is common
for aircraft to be in service for twenty to twenty-five years, and
lessors typically lease aircraft of this age.3 Second, these com-
35 Kin of Flight 541 Victims Win Case vs Plane Suppliers, SUNSTAR DAVAO, Oct. 2,
2005, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/dav/2OO5/10/02/news/kin.of.flight.
541 .victims.win.case.vs.plane.suppliers.html.
36 Koenig, supra note 12.
37 AAR Responds to Inquiries Concerning Settlement of Air Philippines Accident Law-
suit, supra note 10. One of the more absurd assertions made by the plaintiffs'
attorneys implies that lessors have a duty to impose airworthiness standards that
are higher than the standards of the local aviation authority. It is at best difficult
to consider all the policy, economic, and political implications of such a sugges-
tion and the reasons why such a suggestion should never be given any legal effect.
Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this article.
38 Boeing reports that 321 of its model 737 aircraft, the same model involved
in the Air Philippines crash, are in service more than twenty years. Table 1: Boeing
Airplanes in Service, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/
aero_07/corrosn sb table0l.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). According to Boe-
ing, "approximately 20 percent of all commercial jet airplanes flying today are
852
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ments may lead to the belief that lessors are hands-on mainte-
nance providers, while the truth is quite different. As will be
discussed in detail in Part IV, lessors have minimal contact with
the aircraft when it is on lease, leaving the responsibilities of
possessing, operating, maintaining, and insuring the aircraft to
the operator. 9
The industry is also threatened by the fear of being subject to
liability for an aircraft out of its control, which may prevent les-
sors from participating in aircraft leasing, thus severely hinder-
ing the availability of aircraft to airlines and other operators. As
discussed in Part IV, upwards of 30% of commercial aircraft are
financed through operating leases, which would be difficult to
replace if the leasing market suffered a loss of participants.4"
While there has been an instrumental change since Layug with
respect to the Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act,41
this is simply not enough protection. As further evidence of the
risks created by the uncertainty of the applicability of § 44112,
several lawsuits have recently been filed against the lessor of an
considered to be aging airplanes." Structures Engineering Support for Out-of-Produc-
tion Airplanes, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_02/
textonly/ps01txt.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). An aging airplane is one operat-
ing beyond the design service objective, which generally ranges between twenty
and thirty years. Id.
31- See discussion of this and other details of aircraft lease structures infra Part
IV.
40 This is for operating leases alone. Lessors Riding Out the Storm, AIRLINE FLEET
& NETWORK MGMT. 44 (July-Aug. 2008). For example, Continental leases 75% of
its aircraft and U.S. Airways leases 79%. SeeBuREAU OF TRANSP. STATS., U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP., SCHEDULE B-43 AiRCRAFT INVENTORY 46-58, 173-78 (2006), available
at http://www.bts.gov/programs/airlineinformation/schedule-b43/2006/pdf/
entire.pdf.
41 The Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1369, took effect on November 2, 2002, with the purpose of opening federal
courts to class actions that previously did not qualify for federal jurisdiction to
advance the efficient handling of mass disaster accident litigation. Passa v.
Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53-54 (D.R.I. 2004). The MMTJA grants jurisdic-
tion for cases arising out of a single accident where seventy-five people have died
as a result. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2006). The requirement for diversity is mini-
mal, requiring only that one plaintiff and one defendant are from different
states. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(1). The MMTJA would have likely removed a case
like Layug to federal court where, arguably, the preemption of § 44112 would
have been viewed more favorably. However, the MMJTA only applies where
there are seventy-five or more deaths. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a). Additionally, remov-
ing a case to a federal forum may increase the likelihood that federal preemption
would prevail, but it does not guarantee it.
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aircraft that crashed in Brazil.42 This is deeply troublesome to
those in the industry, as the suit seems to follow in Layugs foot-
steps. Similar to the Layug case, the TAM Airlines lawsuits were
filed in the United States after a crash that occurred outside the
United States.43 As reports thus far indicate, an amalgamation
of a few circumstances caused the aircraft to outrun the runway,
cross a highway, and collide into a building, igniting the air-
craft.4 4 These circumstances include a deactivated thrust re-
verser on one of the two engines, the possibility that the thrust-
reverser lever was improperly engaged, and a historically dan-
gerous and slick runway that did not have proper channeling
grooves to avoid hydroplaning.45 The claims, brought in the
District Court of the Southern District of Florida, name the
manufacturers of the aircraft and thrust reversers, TAM's train-
ing provider, and the leasing company as defendants. As of May
2009, approximately seventy suits were pending against the de-
fendants.46 Substantive rulings have not yet been made; how-
ever, the leasing company did assert the affirmative defense that
they are not liable as the lessor of an aircraft under § 44112. 47
42 See, e.g., Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., No. 0:2008cv61391 (S.D. Fl. filed Aug. 29,
2008).
43 Id.
44 Stan Lehman, Brazilian Airline Cancels flights at Airport Where Crash Occurred,
OAKLAND TRIB., Jul. 25, 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4176/
is_20070725/ain 19390474.
45 Some reports focus on the short runway and rainy conditions on the day of
the crash, noting that the Sao Paulo Congonhas Airport has had problems with
the runway. See, e.g., Lehman, supra note 44; George Hatcher, TAM Update,
GEORGE HATCHER'S AIR FLIGHT DISASTER, Nov. 19, 2008, http://airflightdis-
aster.com/?p=1369 ("Sao Paulo Institute of Criminology 16-month investigation
places blame on government agencies for failing to ensure runway safety. Gov-
ernment failure to set rainy-day landing rules for the short runway whose new
surface had not yet been grooved to drain rainwater."). Other reports note the
pilot's failure to retard the thrust reversers for the right-hand engine in the mo-
ments before touchdown. See, e.g., Bobbie Sullivan, Update on TAM Crash in Sao
Paulo, AIRCREw Buzz, Aug. 4, 2007, http://aircrewbuzz.com/2007/08/update-
on-tam-crash-in-sao-paulo.html; David Kaminski-Morrow, TAM A320 Crew Did Not
Retard Right Hand Thrust Lever, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.flightglobal.com/arti-
cles/2007/08/02/215897/tam-a320-crew-did-not-retard-right-hand-thrust-lever.
html ("Flight-data recorder information indicates that the pilots repeatedly
pressed on the brakes in a bid to stop the jet but did not retard the right-hand
thrust lever.").
46 This was determined by a federal-docket search for related suits against the
defendants.
47 Def's Answer to Pl.'s 3d Am. Compl., Nov. 6, 2008.
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II. A SURVEY OF THE RELEVANT CASES
The Layug case is one example of a court that struggled with
the appropriate level of protections under § 44112. While the
better-reasoned court decisions have held that § 44112
preempts state-law claims and that lessors are entitled to the pro-
tections of § 44112, there are a number of cases in which courts
have ruled that § 44112 does not preempt state-law claims or
that certain lessors are not protected or both. This part summa-
rizes the cases that address both preemption and lessor protec-
tion to demonstrate the divergent positions courts have taken
and the reasons the current drafting of § 44112 contributes to
the divergent opinions.
A. PREEMPTION
Since the Federal Aviation Act itself does not impose any lia-
bility upon aircraft finance parties for damages or injuries, the
logical reading of § 44112 is that it preempts any liability under
state law.' 8 The majority of courts have agreed. Rogers v. Ray
Gardner Flying Service, Inc. involved a wrongful-death action aris-
ing out of a private airplane crash.49 The court did not directly
examine whether § 44112, then § 1404, preempted state law but
addressed a different provision of the Federal Aviation Act.5"
The Rogers court noted, however, that if it had been addressing a
claim under § 1404, "our task would be correspondingly sim-
pler" since "[t] his provision appears clearly and forthrightly to
preempt any contrary state law which might subject holders of
security interests to liability for injuries so incurred."'"
48 See 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2006).
49 Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1390 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
50 The Rogers court examined whether 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26), which defined
"operation of aircraft," preempted the Oklahoma law of bailments as it related to
the liability of a lessor for negligent acts. Id. The plaintiffs were parents of two
women killed in a private plane crash. Id. at 1390-91. The pilot was the husband
of one of the decedents, who was renting the plane from the defendants. Id.
The basis of the plaintiffs' claim was that by operation of 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26),
the defendants became vicariously liable for the pilot's negligence and that such
negligence afforded the basis for a wrongful-death action under Oklahoma law.
Id. at 1391-92. The plaintiffs argued that only those exempted by § 1404 should
evade liability. Id. at 1392. The court held that Congress did not intend "to alter
common law principles with a definitional section of a regulatory scheme." Id. at
1393.
51 Id. at 1394. While the Rogers court clearly found (though dicta) that § 1404
preempted state-law claims, its finding that the provision clearly preempted state
law that "might subject holders of security interests to liability" has been perhaps the
2009] 855
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A case in which upholding preemption plays a central role is
that of Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co.52 Matei involved a state-bail-
ment claim against Cessna Aircraft Co. resulting from an air-
plane crash in Chicago.53 The plaintiff named the private
lessor, Robert W. Hansel, as a defendant.54 Hansel had leased
the aircraft to Prompt Air, an air freight service company.5 5
Hansel argued that he was not liable under § 1404 because he
was not in possession or control of the aircraft that was on lease
to Prompt Air at the time of the crash.56 Hansel also noted that
under the lease, the operator undertook all maintenance
obligations.57
The district court in Matei held that "[t]he Federal Aviation
Act specifically exempts a lessor who retains no possession or
control of an aircraft from any liability arising from its use,
where there is a bonafide lease of more than thirty days dura-
tion."" The court further held that the "provision was enacted
in order to remove any doubt concerning a lessor's liability. 5 9
The court, finding the element of "possession or control" com-
mon to both a state bailment claim and a § 1404 defense, evalu-
ated both and, finding no evidence of control, granted the
defendant lessor's motion for summary judgment, holding that
"[f] or the duration of the lease, Hansel relinquished all control,
and Prompt Air assumed the obligation to maintain and repair
the aircraft."6 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, holding
"[T] here is nothing in the record which would even arguably
support Mrs. Matei's assertion that Hansel retained possession
or control of the aircraft at the time it crashed ....61
Though Matei focused on control and is clearly supportive of
preemption, a subsequent key decision misinterpreted the deci-
sion and read Matei as precedent against preemption. As noted
root of confusion for the second issue addressed infra, Part II.B. See id. (emphasis
added).
52 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3611 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affd 35 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that an owner/lessor under an oral lease giving the operator pos-
session and control of the aircraft was not liable for the death of the aircraft's
pilot as the result of a crash).
53 Matei, 35 F.3d at 1143. See also Matei, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3611, at *2.
54 Matei, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3611, at *1-2.
55 Id. at *2.
56 Matei, 35 F.3d at 1144-45.
57 Id. at 1145.
58 Matei, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3611, at *11.
59 Id.
6 Id. at *10-12.
61 Matei, 35 F.3d at 1146.
856
2009] AIRCRAFT CRASHES 857
in Part I, that case is Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney.6 2 Retzler, a flight
attendant, brought suit against a series of defendants including
the aircraft lessor, AMR Leasing Corporation (AMR), for inju-
ries she sustained during an emergency landing due to an al-
leged defect in one of the engines.6 - The plaintiff claimed that
the leasing company was liable for placing a defective engine
into the stream of commerce.64 AMR asserted the protection of
§ 44112, relying on the decision in Matei as properly affirming
that state-law claims against lessors are preempted when the air-
craft is not in their control or possession; however, the Retzler
court disagreed.65
The Retzler court noted that Matei simultaneously addressed
the "possession or control" element under § 44112 and Illinois
bailment law and held that the plaintiffs claims failed under
both. 66 The court concluded that the Matei court implicitly held
that state-law claims were not preempted, reasoning that "[i]f
the federal statute preempted state-law claims, there would have
been no need for the court to reach a decision at all on the
state-law claims. '67 This simply is not a correct interpretation of
Matei. This reasoning ignores Matei's holding that § 44112 "spe-
cifically exempts" lessors and "remove [s] any doubt concerning
a lessor's liability. 68
62 723 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
63 Id. at 348-49.
64 Id. at 351.
65 Id. at 351-52.
66 Id. at 352.
67 Id.
68 Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3611, at *11 (N.D. Ill.
1990). In addition to Retzler's misinterpretation of Matei, the Retzler decision is
plagued by another flaw. Retzler relied upon the reasoning of Abdullah v. American
Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999), to find against preemption. Retzler, 723
N.E.2d at 352-53. The Abdullah case, however, did not even involve preemption
under § 44112. Rather, Abdullah involved passengers suing American Airlines,
the operator of the aircraft (not the lessor), in the District Court of the Virgin
Islands for injuries sustained on a turbulent flight. Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999). The Abdullahjury awarded the plaintiffs dam-
ages, but the district court ordered a new trial, finding that it had "improperly
relied upon territorial common law to establish the standards of care that were
used by the jury ...... Id. at 364. The district court found that the Federal
Aviation Act implicitly preempts territorial standards and thus supporting evi-
dence was wrongly introduced to the jury. Id. After this trial, but before the
resolution on American Airlines post-trial motions, American Airlines proceeded
with litigation in New York. Id. at 364 n.1. The Southern District Court of New
York ultimately held that the preemption of aviation safety was an open issue and
certified it for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit, which declined to ad-
dress the issue. Id. As a result, the parties agreed to be bound by the result of the
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Due to its misinterpretations of Matei and Abdullah, the Retzler
case is flawed. Moreover, as demonstrated by the Layug case, the
Retzler court's flawed reasoning invites plaintiff-favoring courts,
such as the Layug court, to continue and expand the Retzler
court's erroneous logic. While Layug turned to Retzler as prece-
dent, there are cases subsequent to Retzler that recognize and
illustrate Retzler's imperfections. Two of these cases are the Indi-
ana case of In re Lawrence W Inlow Accident Litigation69 and the
Connecticut case of Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co.70
Virgin Islands litigation. Id. The Virgin Islands district court certified this issue:
"Does federal law preempt the standards for air safety, but preserve State and
Territorial damage remedies?" Id. at 364.
The appellate court held that "[f]ederal preemption of the standards of care
[of aviation safety] can coexist with state and territorial tort remedies." Id. at 375.
This has been the general trend when dealing with federal safety standards-
federal law occupies safety standards while state law provides the remedy for the
resulting harm of a breach of those standards. The Retzler court noted Abdullah's
holding and erroneously applied it to preemption of state-liability claims. See Ret-
zler v. Pratt & Whitney, 723 N.E.2d 345, 352-53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). Abdullah
never touched upon lessor liability because the suit was against the operator.
Moreover, taking this holding, which states that federal preemption of the stan-
dards of care for aviation safety can co-exist with state claims and remedies for
the subject tort, to find that no provision of the Federal Aviation Act preempts
state law is wholly overreaching. There is no question that, if a state promulgated
separate laws for safety standards, courts would rule that the Federal Aviation Act
preempts the state standards. The Retzler court erroneously adopted a second
line of reasoning from Abdullah. In determining the relationship between federal
preemption and state remedies, the Abdullah court reasoned that because there is
no federal remedy for injury or death and because the FAA requires air carriers
to maintain liability insurance for bodily injury resulting from the operation or
maintenance of an aircraft, state-law remedies must be available. Abdullah, 181
F.3d at 375-76. In other words, "Congress could not have intended to abolish a
damage remedy for injury or death if it required airlines to maintain insurance
coverage to recompense injured persons." Id. at 375. This argument may have
made sense in Abdullah's context, where the operator of the aircraft was the entity
being sued and the entity required to maintain liability insurance. See id. at 375
(noting the insurance clause of 49 U.S.C. § 41112 (a) requiring that airlines carry
liability insurance). However, such reasoning is inapplicable to cases against les-
sors. Section 44112 exculpates lessors who are not in possession or control of the
aircraft. See 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) (2006) (establishing liability only when a lessor
has "actual possession or control" of an aircraft). Naturally, then, liability would
be imposed on the entity that is in possession or control of the aircraft. Thus, the
operator or air carrier would be subject to liability, rendering the FAA require-
ment that the air carrier have insurance compatible with the statute.
69 No. IP 99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL 331625 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001).
70 Nos. X07CV044001467S & X07CV044003418S, 2005 WL 3624483 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005). Two other cases have also found in favor of preemp-
tion-Esheva v. Siberia Airlines, 499 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y 2007), and Vreeland
v. Ferrer, No. 2005-CA-003535, 2007 WL 5552091 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2007).
The Esheva court addressed liability in a footnote. Esheva, 499 F. Supp. 2d 493,
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Inlow addressed a claim against the sublessor of a helicopter
where the decedent was killed by a rotor blade that hit him in
the head as he disembarked a helicopter.7 CIHC, Inc. was sub-
leasing the helicopter to the operator, Conseco, Inc., of which
the decedent was general counsel. 2 The defendant lessor as-
serted the protection of § 44112. 71 The court held that "[t]he
plain language of § 44112 establishes that it preempts state com-
mon law claims against covered lessors."74 The Inlow court prop-
erly noted that § 44112 would have little meaning if it did not
preempt state law, specifically stating, "Federal common law
generally does not provide a remedy for those injured in aircraft
accidents. The word 'only' could have effect only if the statute
preempts claims against lessors arising under state law. 75
The court also reviewed the legislative history of § 44112 and
noted, as discussed in the next part, that:
[T]he bill was a direct response to the Uniform Aeronautics Act,
which was in force in ten states . . . in 1948. Those state laws
declared the "owner" of every aircraft "absolutely liable" . . . re-
gardless of the owner's degree of control over a lessee. The stat-
utory provision was plainly intended, and plainly written, to
preempt such state statutes and parallel common law claims.76
499 n.4. The case involved an action brought against a Russian air carrier on
behalf of victims of a crash in Russia. Id. at 496. The lessor, Airbus Leasing II,
was named as a defendant. Id. In deciding whether to grant a forum non con-
veniens motion, the court noted that the defendant's argument that the lessor was
added solely to provide an American nexus to the litigation was compelling in
light of the fact that "Airbus is absolutely immune for [sic] such liability in the
United States. American law provides that a 'lessor . . . is liable for personal
injury, death or property loss or damage.., only when a civil aircraft... is in the
actual possession or control of the lessor .... " Id. at 499 n.4.
Vreeland involved a case against Aerolease of America, Inc., a lessor of an air-
craft that crashed in Florida while it was operated by Skyblue Air, Inc. Vreeland,
2007 WL 5552091, at *1. The lessor argued that the Florida Dangerous Instru-
mentality Doctrine, which allowed for an aircraft's owner or lessor to be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of a pilot operating the aircraft, was pre-
empted by § 44112. Id. In a very brief opinion, the Vreeland court agreed. Id. It
held that "under the plain reading" of the statute, the lessor "was not in the
actual possession or control of the airplane," and thus § 44112 applied and pre-
empted the Florida law claim against the lessor defendant. Id. (emphasis
omitted).
71 Inlow, 2001 WL 331625, at *1.
72 Id.
73 Id. at *11, *14.
74 Id. at *14.
75 Id.
76 Id. (citation omitted).
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The Inlow court also recognized the flaws in the Retzler hold-
ing.7" It observed that Retzler's reading of Matei as implicitly re-
jecting preemption by analyzing the state-law claim was
erroneous.78 The Inlow court pointed out that the district court
in Matei expressly held that the statute does preempt state-law
remedies and the appellate court affirmed.79 The Inlow court
noted that the Retzler court "did not acknowledge or consider
the district court's decision in Matei.''s The Inlow court also
noted that the appellate court ignored the fact that the district
court "expressly held that the predecessor statute does preempt
state remedies" and, thus, only considered whether the plaintiff
had a state-law claim as a threshold matter."'
The Inlow court used a combination of common sense and a
review of the legislative history to find in favor of preemption.
The Mangini court also used this approach. Taking a cue from
Inlow, a review of the legislative history convinced the Mangini
court that "[t] he most compelling argument for preemption are
[sic] the House and Senate Reports concerning the passage of
49 U.S.C. § 1404. ''82 Noting the concern with state-liability laws
at the time of its passage, the Mangini court held that "Congress
announced that it intended 49 U.S.C. § 1404 and its present ver-
sion, 49 U.S.C. § 44112 to preempt state law and to exempt from
liability those persons who met the other criteria of those
statutes."8
3
77 Id. at *15.
78 Id.
79 Id. ("The Seventh Circuit did not address in Matei whether § 1404 pre-
empted the plaintiff's state law claim, but the district court in Matei had held that
it did.").
80 Id.
81 Id. The Inlow court also took issue with Retzler's reliance on Abdullah. The
Inlow court observed that Abdullah did opine that the Federal Aviation Act does
not preempt state law remedies generally, but that Retzle's "extension of that
reasoning to the protection for lessors under § 44112(b) was notjustified." Inlow,
2001 WL 331625, at *16. Inlow also noted Retzler's use of the insurance clause
argument from Abdullah. The Inlow court soundly argued that the insurance
clause "pertain[s] to the availability of remedies where there is some basis for
them" and has "no bearing" on § 44112. Id. Consequently, the Inlow court con-
cluded that Retzler's interpretation "strayed from the statutory language and ulti-
mately gives § 44112 no effect .... If§ 44112 did not apply to ... state law ....
§ 44112 would have no apparent effect." Id.
82 Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos. X07CV044001467S & X07CV0440
03418S, 2005 WL 3624483, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005). Note that the




The case analysis above demonstrates that the better-reasoned
cases find § 44112 preempts state-law claims. A combination of
realizing § 44112's ineffectiveness without preemption and a re-
view of the legislative history clearly proves Congress's intent to
bar claims available at state law against specific persons covered
by the statute. The second line of cases that require analysis
includes cases addressing which parties are covered under
§ 44112. A number of courts have wrestled with whether
§ 44112 protects all lessors or just financiers that are owners or
lessors for security purposes only.8 4
B. TYPES OF LESSORS COVERED
The recent Rhode Island case of Coleman v. Windham Aviation,
Inc. addresses the issue of whether Congress intended to cover
lessors under § 44112, specifically concluding that Congress did
not intend to include lessors in the limitation on liability unless
they are lessors only for security purposes.85 This holding is sig-
nificant, as it would exclude a considerable number of lessors
from protection.86
Coleman involved a wrongful-death action brought as a result
of a collision between two private aircraft at a small airport in
Westerly, Rhode Island. 87 The incident occurred while one air-
craft, a Cessna, was taking off and the other aircraft, a Piper, was
attempting to land.88 The pilot of the Piper aircraft survived.89
That pilot had rented the Piper the day of the collision from
Windham Aviation, Inc. (Windham).9 The plaintiff alleged
84 See infra Part II.B.
85 Coleman v. Windham Aviation, Inc., No. K.C. 2004-0985, 2005 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 119, at *14, *16 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 18, 2005).
86 This would exclude the 30% of global aircraft on lease under an operating
lease which includes the significant portion of national air carriers' aircraft under
an operating lease (approximately 85% of the 36% in leasing arrangements). See
infra Part IV.A., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., SCHEDULE B-43
AIRCRAFT INVENTORY (2006), http://www.bts.gov/programs/airlineinforma-
tion/scheduleb43/2006/pdf/entire.pdf. An operating lease is an accounting
term but is widely used to refer to leases where the aircraft is returned (and likely
leased again) to the lessor at the end of the term. Additionally, leases can fall
into more than one category as most distinctions between leases are for specific
purposes (tax, accounting, etc.). See infra Part III.B. Since the definitions are
variable, it is too difficult to exclude lessors from coverage under § 44112 based
on one distinction.
87 Coleman, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 119, at *3-4.
88 Id. at *4.
89 Id.
90 Id. at *3.
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that Windham was vicariously liable for the Piper pilot's negli-
gence because it owned the aircraft.9 1
The defendant invoked federal preemption under § 44112,
contending that any provision of state law that imposes vicarious
liability on the basis of aircraft ownership was preempted.92 The
Coleman court began its analysis by stating that "a cursory review
of § 44112 seems to not only support the Defendant's argument
but also present a conflict with applicable state tort law liability,
a deeper examination of the statute reveals a contrary result."9 3
The court found that the proper starting point was to note the
congressional reports stating that the purpose of the 1994
recodification was to "'revise, codify, and enact without substan-
tive change certain general and permanent laws [ . .] and to
make other technical improvements in the Code.' "-94 The court
reasoned that since the recodification was meant to be nonsub-
stantive, the court was obligated to examine the predecessor
statute to determine whether owners/lessors were covered by its
terms."
The Coleman court examined the original codification under
§ 1404, ultimately finding that Congress did not intend to in-
clude owners or lessors under its limitation unless such owners
or lessors hold only a security interest in the aircraft.96 The
court stated that "[aifter reviewing the committee reports, the
Court has no difficulty concluding that Congress passed § 1404
to facilitate the financing of private airplanes by exempting own-
ers or lessors holding only a security interest in an aircraft
.... The court reached this conclusion by examining parts of
the House report from the 1948 bill that read, "This bill would
make it clear that this generally accepted rule applies and as-
sures the security owner or lessee [sic], that he would not be liable
when he is not in possession or control of the aircraft."98 The
Coleman court noted additional language in the House report
regarding the limitation of leases to thirty days or more and
Congress's stated purpose that the limitation was to "confin[e]
91 Id. at *4.
92 Id. at *6.
93 Id. at *8.
94 Id. at *9 (quoting Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745)
(emphasis omitted).
95 Id. at *13-14.
96 Id. at *16.
97 Id.
98 Id. at *15 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 80-2091, at 1-2 (1948) (emphasis added),
reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1837).
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the section to leases executed as a part of some arrangement for
financing purchases of aircraft."9 The Coleman decision shows
that the court seemed to draw a distinction between what the
industry sometimes refers to as an "operating lessor," or a lessor
that supplies an aircraft that is owned by the lessor, and a "fi-
nance lessor," or a lessor that supplies financing, similar to a
lender, but through a lease structure.
There is no denying that the legislative history surrounding
§ 1404 mentions leases as a part of financing an aircraft and also
often refers to security owners. 00 However, the Coleman court
did not recognize two important points in this regard. First,
lease structures in 1948 consisted only of leases as part of long-
term financing, as other leasing structures did not yet exist. 10'
Second, leases that provide long-term financing often involve a
lessor that holds title to the aircraft solely as a means of estab-
lishing a proper security interest over the aircraft.
Even if lessors that are more than secured parties were ex-
cluded from Congress's original scope of protection, the revi-
sions to the statute in 1994 confirm that operating lessors are, in
fact, protected. The Coleman court ignored the legislative his-
tory surrounding the 1994 revision and focused solely on the
history from 1948, when the market was dramatically different.
The Coleman court implies that this history or any "substantive"
intent behind Congress's 1994 revisions is irrelevant because the
recodification was not meant to be substantive.0 2 This rationale
is unsound. It does not entertain the possibility that Congress,
by way of the recodification, intended to clarify that all lessors
are covered under the statute. This possibility is further sup-
ported by the fact that the recodification's stated purpose was
for "technical improvements."'0 3 In fact, the Coleman court itself
noted that the House report declares that " [i] n the restatement,
simple language has been substituted for awkward and obsolete




101 See infra Part III.B.
102 See Coleman, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 119, at *9-10 (emphasizing "Congress's
strong presumption against affecting any substantive change of the predecessor
statute").
103 H.R. RPP. No. 103-180 (1993). In a section designated "Standard changes,"
the report explains that numerous changes were made "for clarity." Id.
104 Coleman, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 119, at *10, (quoting H.R. RPP. No. 103-
180 (1993)).
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Taking Congress's comments regarding the nonsubstantive
nature of the 1994 revisions to the extent the Coleman court did
is not logical. The revisions in the statute to categorize owners,
lessors, and secured parties as distinct parties could very argua-
bly be "for clarity" or to substitute "simple language ... for awk-
ward and obsolete terms" and not deemed a substantive
change."' 5 As will be discussed more thoroughly in the next
part, interpreting the statute in this way is the most logical inter-
pretation. The legislative history of the 1948 enactment uses
terms like "lessor" and "secured party" interchangeably." 6 Not-
withstanding Congress's varied employment of both terms, Con-
gress's main focus was promoting the availability of aircraft for
public travel.' 7 Based upon Congress's interchangeable use of
"owner," "lessor," and "secured party" and Congress's main fo-
cus on promoting public air travel, it is a logical conclusion that
Congress's 1994 revisions simply clarify the distinctiveness of an
owner, lessor, and secured party. Thus, protecting lessors does
not threaten Congress's original intent, but merely clarifies and
gives proper effect to such intent in the context of the current
aviation finance market.
Although the Coleman decision is troubling, there is precedent
on the issue of lessor protection under § 44112 that presents a
more well-reasoned decision."'8 Mangini, which was discussed
earlier with regard to its holding on preemption, also addressed
105 See id.
106 For examples, see infra Part III.A.
107 See H.R. REP. No. 80-2091 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1836
("The relief thus provided from potential unjust and discriminatory liability is
necessary to encourage such persons to participate in the financing of aircraft
purchases.").
108 The distinction between the type of lessor covered by the statute began,
possibly inadvertently, with the Rogers court, which has caused confusion in subse-
quent cases. Rogers stated that § 1404 "appears clearly and forthrightly to pre-
empt any contrary state law which might subject holders of security interests to
liability for injuries so incurred." Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435
F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added). An interpretation of this lan-
guage to exclude owner and lessors is incorrect for three reasons. First, the de-
fendant in Rogers was a secured party, and therefore the court was really only
concerned with whether a secured party was protected. In fact, a plaintiff in a
similar case argued that Rogers set a precedent that § 1404 is not available to own-
ers. McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129, 1130 (10th Cir. 1971). The
court found "no merit in appellants' argument that Congress, failing to specially
exempt owners and lessors, intended that they be absolutely liable for injuries
sustained by passengers of leased aircraft." Id. Second, the Rogers holding re-
garding § 1404 was dicta. The court was using § 1404 as an example of a provi-
sion of the Federal Aviation Act that clearly preempts state law and made no
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Congress's intent to cover lessors.'019 Mangini involved a lawsuit
against an owner of "an aircraft that sustained a fuel leak or en-
gine fire while in flight."'10 The aircraft ignited upon landing,
killing the passengers.' 1 ' The plaintiffs brought suit under com-
mon-law negligence. 12 The defendant claimed a defense by
way of § 44112.113
Mangini should serve as the most logical approach to discern-
ing Congress's intention in enacting § 44112. The Mangini
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that lessors are distin-
guishable from secured parties and, consequently, are not enti-
tled to protection under § 44112."' The difference between
the Coleman approach and the Mangini approach is simple.
When the Mangini court reviewed the congressional reports stat-
ing that the recodification was for clarification purposes, to
make "technical improvements" and to substitute "simple lan-
guage . . . for awkward and obsolete terms," it found that Con-
gress did, indeed, merely clarify the prior statute and was
responding to the ambiguity of the former statute and confu-
sion created by the conflicting Rogers and McCord cases.1 5 Ac-
cordingly, the Mangini court stated that "[i]n this sense, 49
U.S.C. § 44112 simply clarifies that the word 'owner' in 49
U.S.C. § 1404 was meant literally and was not confined to mean
holders of security interests only."'1 6
Taking the analysis a step further, the Mangini court reasoned
that even if the inclusion and definition of "owner" in the recod-
ified statute was a substantive change, such change is not imper-
missible.117 The Coleman court argued that it could not infer a
substantive change if Congress did not intend a substantive
substantive decisions under § 1404. Lastly, Rogers was enacted before § 1404 was
revised in 1994 and thus does not take any of the revisions into consideration.
109 Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos. X07CV044001467S & X07CV0440
03418S, 2005 WL 3624483, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005).




114 Id. at *4-5 (holding that the inclusion of all three categories, owner, lessor,
and secured party, in § 44112 "is a change too clearly apparent to disregard")
(quoting Sigal v. Wise, 158 A. 891, 894 (Conn. 1932)).
115 Id. at *3.
116 Id.
117 Id. at *4 ("The presumption against substantive change is overcome when
there is a change too clearly apparent to disregard.") (quotation omitted).
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change."l l The Mangini court pointed out, however, that the
Coleman court failed to consider that a presumption against a
substantive change is rebuttable if the alteration is clearly in-
tended to express a change.1 9 The Mangini court held that
while
[i] t is true that the congressional reports [that Coleman cites] ...
repeatedly remark that no substantive changes were intended...
it is far more likely that Congress overstated this general purpose
of recodification than Congress inadvertently inserted a precise
and unequivocal definition of "owner" and specifically stated that
the limitation on liability extended to such well-defined
owners. 
120
Thus, the Mangini court realized that even if Congress effected
substantive changes in the 1994 recodification, such changes
were appropriate due to how clearly Congress drafted and en-
acted them.
Following its analysis of the statutory language, legislative his-
tory, and prior case law, the Mangini court held that either (1)
the addition of separate categories for owners and lessors was
simply a clarification of the vague use of the terms in the prede-
cessor statute and thus in accordance with taking Congress's
"non substantive" purpose literally, or (2) it was a substantive
addition, which is permissible if clearly stated, and thus it could
be that Congress simply overstated the general purpose of the
revisions. 21
The analysis of case law addressing § 44112 demonstrates that
courts struggle with both whether § 44112 preempts state-law
tort claims and whom it protects. Conflicting precedent exists
on both issues, and some courts, including the Layug court, con-
tinue to issue rulings based upon misinterpretations of
§ 44112.122 In order to preserve lawsuits by sympathetic plain-
tiffs in cases where § 44112's preemption would otherwise pro-
vide for dismissal, courts have found ambiguities in the current
statute, as well as its legislative history, to argue against preemp-
tion, based on either no preemption of state-law claims or no
118 Coleman v. Windham Aviation, Inc., No. K.C. 2004-0985, 2005 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 119, at *16 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 18, 2005).
119 Mangini, 2005 WL 3624483, at *4-5 (quoting United States v. Sischo, 262
U.S. 165,168-69 (1923) ("[A] codification ... is not lightly to be read as making
a change, although of course it may do so.")).
120 Id. at *5.
121 Id.; see also text accompanying supra note 120.
122 See cases cited supra Part II.
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protection for certain lessors. Clarification of the statute to ef-
fectively implement Congress's intent appears necessary. How-
ever, before addressing what clarifications the statute may need,
it is necessary to thoroughly evaluate the language of the statute
and Congress's stated intention in enacting § 44112. The next
part provides a thorough and logical review of § 44112, includ-
ing its predecessor statutes and legislative history, imparting
compelling arguments that § 44112 both preempts state-law
claims and protects lessors.
III. SECTION 44112 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE
Congress originally enacted a limitation on lessor and lender
liability with respect to aviation incidents as part of the Civil Aer-
onautics Act.123 This part examines the legislative history with
respect to lessor and lender liability.
A. CONGRESS'S INTENTION TO PREEMPT STATE LAWv
Congress promulgated the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938 to
transfer federal civil aviation responsibilities, which then rested
with the Department of Commerce, to a newly formed Civil Aer-
onautics Authority in order "to centralize commercial and safety
regulation of civil air travel." 124 The Civil Aeronautics Act did
not address lessor liability until ten years later, in 1948, when
Congress amended it to add § 504 in order to "limit[ ] the liabil-
ity of certain persons not in possession of aircraft. '' 12' The provi-
sion read as follows:
No person having a security interest in, or security title to, any
civil aircraft under a contract of conditional sale, equipment
trust, chattel or corporate mortgage, or other instrument of simi-
lar nature, and no lessor of any such aircraft under a bona fide
lease of thirty days or more, shall be liable by reason of such in-
terest or title, or by reason of his interest as lessor or owner of the
aircraft so leased, for any injury to or death of persons, or dam-
123 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 482, sec. 504, § 2455, 62 Stat. 470, 470
(1948).
124 Douglas B. Harris, Civil Aeronautics Act (1938), in MAJOR ACTS OF CONGRESS
(2004), excerpt available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lG2-3407400039.
html. The Civil Aeronautics Authority later became the Civil Aeronautics Admin-
istration, and in 1958, the Federal Aviation Agency (to become the Federal Avia-
tion Administration) was created to take over its responsibilities. A Brief History
of the Federal Aviation Administration, http://www.faa.gov/about/history/
brief history/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
125 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 482, sec. 401, § 504, 62 Stat. 470, 470
(1948).
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age to or loss of property, on the surface of the earth (whether
on land or water) caused by such aircraft, or by the ascent, de-
scent, or flight of such aircraft or by the dropping or falling of an
object therefrom, unless such aircraft is in the actual possession
or control of such person at the time of such injury, death, dam-
age, or loss. 126
The preemption called for in § 504 raises the question of what
exactly Congress aimed to preempt. The only logical conclu-
sion is that state-law claims are the only bodies of law that, ab-
sent preemption, would create potential liability for lessors and
other financing parties. Therefore, if the preemption did not
apply to state law, it would have no purpose. However, to the
extent that this was in doubt, the legislative history unmistakably
reveals Congress's intentions.
The House report demonstrates that Congress enacted § 504
to preempt provisions of "present Federal and State law [that]
might be construed to impose upon persons who are owners of
aircraft for security purposes only, or who are lessors of aircraft,
liability for damages caused by the operation of such aircraft
even though they have no control over the operation of the air-
craft." 27 Particularly, the House report notes a concern regard-
ing the Uniform Aeronautics Act, a statute that was adopted in
ten states at the time that Congress enacted § 504.12
The House report explains that the Uniform Aeronautics Act
imposed absolute liability on an aircraft owner "whether such
owner was negligent or not."'129 The report also notes Con-
gress's concern that the statute was "susceptible of a construc-
tion which would impose liability upon any person registered as
owner, even though he holds title only as security under a mort-
gage ... or as lessor under an equipment trust" and that if such
an interpretation was adopted, owners not in possession or con-
trol of the aircraft "could become liable for extensive damages
on the surface caused by the operation of the aircraft."'3 0 Thus,
the purpose of the provision was to "remove this doubt by pro-
viding clearly that such persons have no liability under such cir-
cumstances."' 13' According to the report, "It is the conviction of
126 Id.
127 H.R. REP. No. 80-2091 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1836.
128 Id.
129 Id., reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1836-37.
130 Id., reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1837.
131 Id., reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1836.
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the committee that the bill should be passed to remove one of
the obstacles to the financing of purchases of new aircraft."'1 32
Between 1948 and 1958, the civil aviation industry underwent
significant change with, among other changes, the introduction
of jet airliners. 133 In response, Congress passed the Federal Avi-
ation Act of 1958, creating the Federal Aviation Agency to take
over the responsibilities of the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion." 4 Title V of the Federal Aviation Act retained the provi-
sions of Title V of the Civil Aeronautics Act, including the
limitation of liability previously existing under § 504. This sec-
tion was codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1404. In 1959, Congress pro-
posed an amendment to § 1404.135
Concerned once again with the imposition of liability under
state law and that such imposition would hinder the availability
of aircraft, Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act. 136
Since the original enactment already protected aircraft finan-
ciers and lessors, Congress amended the provision so that the
limitation of liability included an exemption for financiers and
lessors of engines and propellers, as well as aircraft. 37 The
House report again specifically points to the fear that claims
may be brought under state law and unmistakably notes the in-
tention to preempt such claims and, thus, expresses the same
purpose as the original statute. The report notes that
since those interested in leasing or separately financing aircraft
engines and propellers interpret the so-called absolute liability
laws enacted by various states as applying to them, they are un-
willing to enter into such arrangements unless the law is
132 Id., reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1837.
133 At this time, after World War II, the country became more affluent, raising
the demand for travel. Additionally, "improved technology made air travel faster,
safer, and cheaper." John E. Robson, Airline Deregulation: Twenty Years of Success
and Counting, REGULATION 18 (Spring 1998), available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/regulation/regv21 n2/airline2-98.pdf.
134 The Federal Aviation Act was originally codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301. It
was repealed in 1994 and recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-49105. The broad
authority it gives to the Federal Aviation Administration is found at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2000).
135 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 86-81, § 504, 73 Stat. 180,
180-81 (1959) (detailing the subsequent amendment).
136 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 86-81, §§ 503-04, 73 Stat. 180,
180-81 (1959) (stating that the purpose of the amendment is "to facilitate financ-
ing of certain aircraft engines and propellers").
137 Id.
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amended to provide them the same protection now afforded
holders of security interest in aircraft.'
Accordingly, in response to the concern that engine financiers
and lessors would no longer participate in the business, Con-
gress included them in § 1404.139
Congress's focus on ensuring that aircraft and engines were
available by protecting their providers surely demonstrates an
intent to preempt state-law claims against such providers. Con-
gress's concern with the Uniform Aeronautics Act and other
similar "absolute liability laws" was clearly its motivation for en-
acting the protection in the first place. 4 ° Congress wanted to
make sure aircraft and engine lenders and lessors were not dis-
suaded from participating in the industry for fear of exposing
themselves to costly liability. 14' The only way to alleviate the fear
imposed by state absolute-liability laws would be preemption.
Thus, the only logical conclusion is that Congress intended
§ 1404 to preempt state-law claims.
B. CONGRESS'S INTENT TO INCLUDE LESSORS
Courts have struggled with Congress's intent with respect to
two issues under § 44112: preemption of state law, as discussed
above, and the extent of preemption for lessors, which is ad-
dressed in this Part. The Layug court did not address the issue
of whether and to what extent lessors are covered under
§ 44112; however, this issue has arisen in recent case law, as dis-
cussed in Part II. As with the issue of preemption, the legislative
history provides significant detail as to whether Congress in-
tended that lessors should benefit from the protections of
§ 44112. In fact, the legislative history constantly discusses "les-
sors" as a category of financiers to be protected under § 44112.
Unfortunately, the term "lessor" was, in 1948, and remains to-
day, somewhat ambiguous, covering a wide range of roles that
different financiers play in different financing structures. The
terms and structure of a "lease" can vary significantly and such
138 H.R. REP. No. 86-445, at 2 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1762, 1763.
The section remained the same but for the addition of "aircraft engine or propel-
ler" after each mention of "aircraft."
139 Section 1404 was recodified in 1994 at 49 U.S.C. § 44112. See infra Part IIIB
(discussing this revision).
140 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussing limitation of
liability).




variance can impact the ease with which one can apply preemp-
tion under § 44112. When the terms and conditions of a lease
vary from those of a secured transaction, a more detailed analy-
sis of the legislative history and the use of the term "lessor" is
necessary, but the result remains that lessors should be entitled
to the protection of preemption under § 44112. The courts that
have tried to evaluate the preemption as applicable to lessors
have failed to note the differentiations across the various trans-
actions that can be characterized as "leases." This part will work
through the references to "lessor" in the legislative history, as
well as the historical context of such references with respect to
the aviation finance marketplace at the times such references
were made to determine Congress's intentions behind the use
of "lessor." This part also will address the broader intent of Con-
gress to enhance the availability of aircraft in order to ascertain
the extent to which Congress intended that the protections of
§ 44112 be extended to lessors to further this intent.
Prior to evaluating how Congress intended § 44112 to apply
to lessors, it is important to review some of the different types of
leases. First, one must distinguish a lease from a loan. In a loan,
a purchaser desires to buy an aircraft but needs financing. 1 42
Funds are advanced from a lender and repaid by the borrower
with interest. 4 ' The borrower receives legal title to the aircraft
and pledges the asset as collateral for the loan. 144 Therefore,
the lender has a security interest in, or lien on, the aircraft.
Consequently, this type of loan is a "secured transaction."' '45 In
a lease, that same operator desires to acquire an aircraft, but it
does not desire or perhaps does not have the capital to purchase
the aircraft. Unlike a lender, a lessor purchases the aircraft,
holds title to it, and leases it to the lessee. 4 6 The lessor is the
"owner" of the aircraft. Thus, the essential difference between a
lease and a secured transaction is ownership. However, this line
can be easily blurred. For example, if the lease uses up the eco-
nomic useful life of the goods, thus depriving the lessor of a
142 See generally Frederick E. Hines, Legal Difficulties in Secured Airlines Equipment
Financing, 15J. AIR L. & COM. 11 (1948).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (classifying a secured transaction as any trans-
action "that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by
contract").
146 See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS No. 13 (1976), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas13.pdf.
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"meaningful economic stake" in the residual value of the aircraft
at the time the lease expires, it is likely to be deemed a secured
transaction and not a lease.147 Though less common in aircraft
transactions, leases that give the lessee a right or obligation to
buy the equipment at the end of the term at a "bargain" price
are often deemed loans because one could argue that the lessee
undoubtedly will exercise its option and therefore should be
viewed and treated as the owner.14 Thus, the distinction be-
tween a secured transaction and a lease is not always clear or
easy, particularly when a secured transaction is incorrectly docu-
mented by the parties as a lease.' 49
One context where the distinction of a lease and a secured
transaction is critical is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
If the financing is a secured transaction, it is governed by Article
9 of the UCC. If it is a "true lease" it is governed by Article 2A of
the UCC. 15 ° As discussed, characterization as a secured transac-
tion tends to revolve around ownership. For example, under a
true lease, where the lessor is viewed as the owner of the aircraft,
it is not necessary for the lessor to file a financing statement to
preserve its ownership or priority in an aircraft.' 15 In a secured
transaction, however, this filing is necessary to preserve the
owner's priority against bankruptcy trustees or other third par-
ties. 5 2 In fact, many lessors file precautionary financing state-
ments to avoid becoming an unsecured creditor if the lease is
recharacterized as a secured transaction. 153 Again demonstrat-
ing a focus on ownership, unlike secured transactions, a lessee
in a true lease has the right, at the expiration of the lease, "to
walk away from the transaction .. .without penalty, before be-
147 Edward K. Gross, Chapter 28: Middle Market Leasing and Syndication, in 2
EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 28-6, 28-7 n.4 (Arnold G. Gough & Ian
Shrank eds., Practising Law Institute, 4th ed. 1999).
148 Michael Downey Rice, EQUIPMENT FINANCING, 1.8 Aspen Law and Business,
New York (2001).
149 Edward K. Gross & Robert W. Ihne, ALI-ABA Leasing "Hot Topics", in The
New Uniform Commercial Code 209, 221-23 (2007).
150 It is important to note that characterization as secured party or lessor has
many far-reaching consequences. It affects the secured party or lessor's priority
against other creditors, the remedies available upon the lessee's default, includ-
ing the ability to recover the aircraft, and the default payment provisions of the
lease, to name a few. See generally id.
151 Richard F. Duncan et al., THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF SECURED TRANSAC-
TIONS: WORKING WITH ARTICLE 9, § 1.04(5) (Law Journal Press 2004) (1987).
152 Id. § 1.04(2).




coming the owner, or before exhausting the economic useful
life" of the aircraft. 154 This is because true lessors contemplate
leasing their aircraft to a subsequent lessee.
As mentioned above, a transaction may be documented as a
lease and later recharacterized as a secured transaction. 55 This
occurs if the lease is terminable without compensation and has
terms that include any of the following: (1) its term is equal to
or greater than the economic life of the asset; (2) the lessee
must renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the
property or is required to take ownership of it; (3) there is an
option to renew for the remaining economic life of the asset,
but no additional or only nominal consideration need be paid
to exercise that option; or (4) the lessee has an option to
purchase the property for little or no additional considera-
tion. 56 These factors reveal a structure where the lessee is tak-
ing on the role of the owner of the aircraft and is thus not a true
lease.
Characterization of a transaction under the UCC is not as sim-
ple as true lease (Article 2A) and secured transaction (Article
9). Article 2A of the UCC also covers a specific subset of true
leases called "finance leases."1 57 The differences that cause a
transaction to be characterized as a finance lease or a secured
transaction are subtle and often confused.158 Finance leases are
much like secured transactions, except that they meet specific
requirements that preserve the transaction as a lease. In a true
lease, the lessor gives to the lessee possession and the right to
use the goods for a fixed period of time in return for rent. Title
to the property and a meaningful residual interest remain with
the lessor. A "finance lease" is a true lease in which the lessor is
not the fundamental supplier of the goods leased but leases
goods to lessees as a means of financing their acquisition from
the supplier. UCC Article 2A generally treats finance leases as
154 Gross, supra note 147, at 28-13.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
156 U.C.C. APP. D § 1-201(37) (1987).
157 Further, given certain conditions, a non-true lease could also be character-
ized as a sale to which Article 2 of the UCC is applied. See, e.g., Key Equip. Fin.,
Inc. v. Pioneer Transp., Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1138-39 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
(discussing difference between finance leases and sales). For an analysis of the
significance of this holding, see Gross & Ihne, supra note 149, at 215-16.
158 EQUIPMENT FINANCING at 5.7. The similarity of function shared by finance
leases and secured loans suggests that there will always be a certain difficulty in
distinguishing the two, as elements of both types of instruments are alloyed to
produce the right financial product for a particular situation.
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true leases, but treats them differently from other true leases in
some respects.
5 9
The distinction of a finance lease is important for other rea-
sons, including tax and accounting purposes. Many airlines or
other operators lease aircraft to keep the related assets and lia-
bilities off their balance sheet. 6 ° In this context, a lease is dis-
tinguished as either an "operating lease" or a "capital lease."'161
If a lease is an operating lease, the lease obligations are off the
lessee's balance sheet and included in the footnotes. 62 If a
lease is a capital lease, it appears as a long-term debt.163 Also,
federal tax rules make distinctions between "tax leases" and
"conditional sales leases."' 164 If a lease is a tax lease, the lessee
may treat the rental payment as a business expense or deduc-
tion. If the lease is a conditional sale, then only the interest
component is deductible.' 65 When the IRS made these distinc-
tions in 1955, it caused the split between leases for security and
true leases.166 Originally, accounting rules for distinguishing be-
tween capital and operating leases, and tax rules for distinguish-
ing between tax and conditional sales leases, seemed to
coincide. However, tax guidelines are a culmination of "both
objective and subjective characteristics, while accountants' crite-
ria are fundamentally quantitative."167
15q Finance lessors are afforded certain financing party protections. For exam-
ple, lessors receive the protection of absolute payment rights. See, e.g., Gross &
Ihne, supra note 149, at 219 (detailing "lessees' 'absolute and unconditional' obli-
gation to make all payments"). Triggers causing default by the lessee are more
limited for true leases. Treatment as a finance lease also permits the pass
through of warranties and other rights directly to the lessee as against the sup-
plier. Gross & Ihne, supra note 149, at 216. For a complete examination of other
differences in treatment, see generally 2003 Amendments, Uniform Commercial Code:
Article 2A-Leases, UNIFORM LAw COMMISSIONERS (Chicago, IL), available at http:/
/www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-summaries/uniformacts-s-ucc2a2003.asp.
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
160 See Airlines 101-A Primerfor Dummies, AIRLINE MONITOR, 22-23 (Nov. 1998),
available at http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/books-online/Air-
lineslOl.pdf (discussing leasing as a solution for airlines' capital needs).
161 EQUIPMENT FINANCING at 1.9. See also FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
supra note 146, at 7-9.
162 EQUIPMENT FINANCING at 1.9.
163 Id.
164 IRS Revenue Ruling 55-540 sets forth detailed guidelines for these catego-
ries to set forth who, lessor or lessee, gets the tax depreciation and various deduc-
tions. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 5.27. Further complicating the process of distinguishing a lease from
a loan are certain hybrids like the synthetic lease. The synthetic lease is a popular
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As is demonstrated by this brief survey, the distinctions be-
tween leases are variable. Seemingly simple nomenclature is not
so simple. Consequently, when courts or Congress use terms
like "lease for security" or a lease for the purposes of financing,
it should not be taken too purposefully. Moreover, leasing has
developed throughout the decades. In 1948, there was very little
leasing of any kind, and, until the 1980s, operating leases (which
today are a common finance tool and constitute a significant
percentage of the aviation finance market) were almost non-ex-
istent.16 8 Clearly, the term "lease" in 1948 had a much different
meaning than it had when Congress revised the statute in 1994.
Given the variety in leasing structures, it is difficult to deter-
mine with certainty the historical context of a lease in 1948.
Commentary at the time suggests that all leases were part of
long-term financings. 6 In fact, it was around this time that
commentators expressed concern that lease structures would
continue to exacerbate the airlines' credit problems because
these structures derive their worth from the credit of the air-
line. y° Despite the prevalence of secured loans, and although
Congress likely was not fully aware of the many types of lessors,
especially since operating leases did not yet exist, Congress was
certainly cognizant of lessors as a separate category from se-
cured lenders. For example, when expressing concern with ab-
solute-liability laws adopted by certain states, the House report
notes that " [p]rovisions of present Federal and State law might
be construed to impose upon persons who are owners of aircraft
for security purposes only, or who are lessors of aircraft, liability for
damages . *...""' Later in the report, Congress expressed con-
cern over liability laws and phrased it this way: "It is susceptible
of a construction which would impose liability upon any person
"off-balance-sheet" structure. It provides a transaction that is off the balance
sheet, but permits the obligor to retain the tax benefits. The methods are com-
plicated and include carefully crafted purchase options, return provisions, and
rental adjustment clauses. For a more detailed analysis, see EQUIPMENT FINANCING
at 5.28.
168 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
169 See, e.g., Walter H. Wager, Report on Air Transportation of Aviation Securities
Committee of Investment Bankers Association of America, 16 J. AIR L. & COM. 223,
234-35 (1949). See also Hines, supra note 142, at 11 (observing that "[b]etween
1936 and 1942, nine airlines entered into twelve arrangements for secured fi-
nancing, nine involving chattel mortgages, one involving a lease-purchase agree-
ment, and two involving equipment trusts").
170 See discussion supra Part W.A.
171 H.R. REP. No. 80-2091 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1836
(emphasis added).
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registered as owner, even though he holds title only as security
under a mortgage or similar security instrument or as lessor under
an equipment trust' and "[t] his bill... assures the security owner
or lessee [sic], that he would not be liable when he is not in pos-
session or control of the aircraft."' 7 2 Congress revised the stat-
ute in 1959 to include lessors and lenders "to facilitate the leasing
or separate financing of propellers and aircraft engines needed
to modernize the Nation's civil aircraft fleet."'73 In the House
report on such revision, it was noted that § 504 "recognizes the
practical difficulties faced by sellers, lessors, or mortgagors of air-
craft . . . in undertaking to avoid circumstances and events
which might lead to liability suits from buyers, lessees, mortga-
gees, or third parties ....""'
Similar to the lack of distinctions in the legislative history,
courts have not specifically addressed the nuances between types
of leases. A review of the case law in Part III reveals the courts'
general tendency to consider a "lease" a lease, without any ex-
amination as to whether it is actually a secured transaction, let
alone any analysis as to what type of lease it may be.175 For ex-
ample, the court in Matei referred to an "oral lease" that existed
between the defendant lessor and a lessee and applied the pre-
emption found in § 44112 to the defendant lessor because the
lessee had agreed to maintain and repair the aircraft. 17 6
Though not specifically discussed in these terms, it appears that
this was not a finance lease or secured transaction. This distinc-
tion, however, was not addressed. Rather, the court considered
the transaction as a lease without any analysis as to whether the
transaction was truly a lease or actually a secured transaction
and focused on whether the lessor had possession or control of
the aircraft. 77
Similarly, in the Inlow case, the court found a sublease be-
tween a parent company and its subsidiary sufficient to merit the
protection of § 44112.178 The plaintiff argued that the lease
should not be considered under § 44112 because the sublease
172 Id., reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1837 (emphasis added).
173 H.R. REP. No. 86-445, at 2 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1762, 1763
(emphasis added).
174 Id. at 8, reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1762, 1767 (emphasis added).
175 See generally supra Part III.
176 Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 35 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1994).
177 Id.
178 In re Lawrence W. Inlow Accident Litig., No. IP 99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL
331625, at *14-15 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001).
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from the parent to the subsidiary was not necessary for the sub-
sidiary to procure financing for the helicopter. 179 The court dis-
regarded this point, stating,
As a lessor of civil aircraft, [the sublessor] falls squarely within
the purview of § 44112. The application of the statute does not
call for any inquiry into whether the lessor's role in financing a
transaction was necessary, convenient, or anything else. The is-
sues under the statute are simply whether there was a lease for
more than 30 days and whether the lessor had actual possession
or control of the aircraft. 180
As the Mangini and Inlow courts note, the best reading of
§ 44112 is that lessors are a separate category entitled to pre-
emption. 8" If one adopts this reasoning, then it is not necessary
to address distinctions among leasing structures. However, the
objections to lessors as a separate category raised by other courts
should be addressed. In addressing such objections, the distinc-
tions among leasing structures can be informative and help to
narrow the potential objection.
The Coleman court asserts that Congress intended to protect
only lessors acting as secured parties.8 2 Even granting validity
to the Coleman court's assertion, it follows that lessors who act as
secured parties should be entitled to preemption under
§ 44112. The Coleman court's analysis of the legislative history of
§ 44112 is based on the House report of 1948.183 In 1948, the
various leasing structures available in the current finance mar-
ket did not exist. Logically, therefore, the Coleman court's asser-
tion that only lessors acting as secured parties are covered must
be evaluated and applied in the context of the variety of leasing
179 Id. at *14.
180 Id. The only court that deliberately examines the type of leasing transac-
tion behind the facts is the Coleman court. See Coleman v. Windham Aviation,
Inc., No. K.C. 2004-0985, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 119, at *14-16 (R.I. Super. Ct.
July 18, 2005). Coleman took issue with whether the statute applied to true lessors
as it did lessors acting only as secured parties (and, thus, not really lessors at all).
Jd. This question may have been more perplexing before the 1994 revisions, but
as the Mangini court properly notes, such reasoning ignores the impact of the
additional subsections Congress added in 1994 (addressed in the following
paragraphs) which clearly define "three classes of exempt persons, . . . 'lessor,
owner, or secured party."' Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos.
X07CV044001467S & X07CV044003418S, 2005 WL 3624483, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Dec. 7, 2005). Therefore, such "conclusion defies common sense and ren-
ders the explicit words of Congress nugatory." Id. at *5.
181 Id. at *4-5; Inlow, 2001 WL 331625, at *14.
182 Coleman, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 119, at *16.
183 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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structures now available. As discussed above, one of the more
relevant categories of leasing structures is finance leases. 184 As
noted, finance leases are nothing more than secured transac-
tions. 8 5 A lessor under a finance lease is really just a secured
party and consequently is, even under the restrictive reading of
§ 44112 espoused by the Coleman court, entitled to the protec-
tion of § 44112.
If it is clear that, even under Coleman's restrictive interpreta-
tion of § 44112, finance lessors are entitled to preemption
under § 44112, then the subsequent question is whether other
lessors (in the aviation finance market, primarily "operating les-
sors") should also be entitled to such preemption. When one
analyzes the legislative history of § 44112 and applies the logic
and reasoning of Congress in 1948 to today's operating lease
market, it is equally clear that operating lessors should be enti-
tled to preemption.
There are two strong arguments for including operating les-
sors within the protections of § 44112. First, the legislative his-
tory of § 44112 and its predecessor statutes clearly demonstrates
that protecting operating lessors is consistent with Congress's
legislative intent.'86 Second, today's operating lessor acts as a
financial party, facilitating the long-term availability of aircraft
to operators (and through the operators, to the public). Oper-
ating lessors provide a significant portion of the current supply
of commercial aircraft, and the typical operating lessor runs its
business and manages its assets virtually identically to the way a
finance lessor runs its business and manages its assets. 187 Given
the prevalence of operating leasing in today's market and such
similarities among lenders, finance lessors, and operating les-
sors, it is logical to conclude, whether based on the general ar-
guments that Congress intended that lessors should be covered
under § 44112 or based on the more restrictive arguments es-
184 See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text
185 See supra note 159 (stating that finance leases and secured loans are difficult
to distinguish). Again, note that the main structural difference within a finance
lease is that the lessor is not the main supplier of the goods but rather is using the
lease payments to finance its own purchase of the aircraft. In other words, the
lessor is the borrower under a loan, or secured transaction, and is a lessor under
a lease with the operator. For the operator, however, the arrangement is the
same as if it were directly purchasing and financing the aircraft from the supplier
with respect to terms and payments.
186 See discussion supra Part III.A.
187 This and other details on the organization and operation of leasing compa-
nies will be addressed in Part IV.
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poused by courts such as Coleman that only lessors which are se-
cured parties should be covered, that operating lessors deserve
the same protections as finance lessors and therefore are pro-
tected under § 44112.
In 1994, Congress revised and restructured § 1404 as part of a
reorganization of the Federal Aviation Administration.1 8 1 Con-
gress enacted the revised statute at a time when operating leases
were on the rise, which makes an examination of this revision
particularly helpful. The provision was recodified in 1994 as 49
U.S.C. § 44112, which provides:
(a) Definitions. In this section:
(1) "lessor" means a person leasing for at least 30 days a civil
aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller.
(2) "owner" means a person that owns a civil aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller.
(3) "secured party" means a person having a security interest
in, or security title to, a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propel-
ler under a conditional sales contract, equipment trust con-
tract, chattel or corporate mortgage, or similar instrument.
(b) Liability. A lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for per-
sonal injury, death, or property loss or damage on land or water
only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the
actual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured
party, and the personal injury, death, or property loss or damage
occurs because of:
(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or
(2) the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine,
or propeller.'
8 9
The language of the provision is formatted differently than
the original codification.' 9" The revised format visibly breaks
188 See A Brief History of the Federal Aviation Administration, http://
www.faa.gov/about/histoiy/brief history/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (detailing
the restructuring).
189 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2006).
190 Compare this text with the original text of § 504 (supra Part III.A), as well as
the text of § 1404, as follows:
No person having a security interest in, or security title to, any civil
aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller under a contract of condi-
tional sale, equipment trust, chattel or corporate mortgage, or
other instrument of similar nature, and no lessor of any such air-
craft, aircraft engine, or propeller under a bona fide lease of thirty
days or more, shall be liable by reason of such interest or title, or by
reason of his interest as lessor or owner of the aircraft, aircraft en-
gine, or propeller so leased, for any injury to or death of persons,
or damage to or loss of property, on the surface of the earth
(whether on land or water) caused by such aircraft, aircraft engine,
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the provision into clearer and more manageable segments.
Most noticeable is section (a), where Congress provides more
concrete definitions of the parties intended to be included in
the provision. 9' It sets forth three clear, distinct roles: lessor,
owner, and secured party.'9 2 Section (b) then limits the liability
of these individual parties for property damages and personal
injuries to those lessors, owners, and secured parties that, like
the original codification, are in "actual possession or control" of
the aircraft or aircraft engine. 9
3
The most logical approach to these provisions is to conclude
that by breaking these parties into three distinct categories and
then separately defining those categories, Congress intended all
three categories to be covered under the statute in their individ-
ual capacities. As discussed, some court interpretations of the
original statute found that while lessors and owners were men-
tioned in the statute, they appeared to be covered only to the
extent that they were owners or lessors for the purpose of fi-
nancing.194 Congress's reorganization of the statute, however,
clarifies that lessors and owners each are a distinct category, sep-
arate and apart from secured parties.
A proper analysis of the current § 44112 should conclude that
lessors of all types are covered.19 5 In enacting § 44112, Congress
had the opportunity to exclude certain types of lessors and de-
clined to do so. This may be the strongest evidence that Con-
gress's view of the purpose of § 44112 evolved with the aviation
finance industry and that Congress decisively intended that all
lessors are to be protected. Note that the definition of "lessor"
remains simply any lessor in a lease with a term of at least thirty
or propeller, or by the ascent, descent, or flight of such aircraft,
aircraft engine, or propeller or by the dropping or falling of an
object therefrom, unless such aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller
is in the actual possession or control of such person at the time of
such injury, death, damage, or loss.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 86-81, § 504, 73 Stat. 180, 180 (1959).
191 49 U.S.C. § 44112(a).
192 Id.
193 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b).
194 See the discussion of Coleman, supra Part II.B.
195 Recall that this was the logic in Mangini. See Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
Nos. X07CV044001467S & X07CV044003418S, 2005 WL 3624483, at *3, *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005) (holding that the § 44112 revision "simply clari-
fies that the word 'owner' . . . was meant literally and was not confined to mean
holders of security interests only" and further that even if the change was substan-




days. 96 Additionally, Congress's revisions made "owners" a sep-
arate category, evidencing a desire for any owner (not just own-
ers for security purposes, as that would be a "secured party") to
be shielded from liability when not in control or possession of
the aircraft.1 97 Thus, it would make little sense for outright own-
ers to be protected but owners leasing aircraft to be excluded.
Congress's changes make sense only if they are read as written,
addressing three distinct and entirely separate parties.
While it seems clear that Congress always intended to include
lessors within the protection of § 44112, the significant presence
of operating lessors in today's market and the crucial role they
play in the overall availability of aircraft fit clearly within Con-
gress's broader intent to support the availability of aircraft and
provide another layer of arguments for including lessors within
the protections of § 44112. Today, operating lessors provide al-
most one-third of the aircraft in the aviation finance market. 198
Since operating leases were not yet employed for aircraft when
Congress amended the Civil Aeronautics Act to include § 504 to
limit the liability of certain parties, Congress did not consider
such leases; however, the development of operating leasing as a
significant means of providing aircraft to operators dictates that
Congress's broad intent in enacting § 44112 must be applied to
the operating-lease market as it exists today. As will be discussed
in more detail in the next part, operating lessors do not act in a
manner that is materially different from how finance lessors or
lenders act.199 Moreover, despite the various distinctions found
under tax, accounting, and UCC regimes, all leases serve the
same overall purpose for the lessee-a means to obtain an air-
craft it cannot afford (or otherwise does not want) to purchase.
Congress's broader intent in enacting a limitation on liability
was to facilitate the availability of capital for financing aircraft,
and this broad intent far outweighs nuanced distinctions among
various types of leases. Thus, any lease that provides for the
long-term availability of an aircraft should be protected.
The next part will outline the development of leases as related
to the aviation finance market. This analysis will clearly demon-
strate that Congress's interchangeable use of "lessor" and "se-
196 49 U.S.C. § 44112(a).
197 See 49 U.S.C. § 44112.
198 Christopher Hinton, Airline Turmoil Opens Doors to Aircraft Lessors,
MARKETWATCH, May 6, 2008, http://wwvv.marketwatch.com/story/aircraft-les-
sors-eye-opportunity-in-airline-woes.
199 See infra Part IV.B.
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cured party" reflected the manner in which aircraft finance
transactions were structured at that time-where leases were fi-
nance leases and more similar, if not identical, to secured loans.
It will also explain the relatively late development of the operat-
ing lease and thus reveal that the 1994 amendment was likely a
consequence of this development and subsequent change in the
structure of certain transactions in order to provide protection
for this emerging new finance party.
IV. AIRCRAFT LEASE TRANSACTIONS
In order to provide relevant information on the role of lessors
in today's aviation finance market, it is helpful to illustrate the
role of lessors and the levels of control they can hold over air-
craft. This part will describe the development of the current
aircraft lease market, identify the different types of leasing com-
panies, and explain their organizational and leasing structures.
As will become clear, the typical lessor functions no differently
than a lender and is in no better position to exercise control
over an aircraft it owns and leases than a lender who has fi-
nanced an aircraft.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEASES
The commercial aviation market developed significantly fol-
lowing World War 11.200 After the war, airlines were heavily regu-
lated by the federal government. 20 1 Federal regulation ended
when Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978,
which made it easier for new airlines to enter the market and
establish diverse business approaches.2 °2 Since deregulation,
the number of airlines in operation and the number of passen-
gers has increased considerably. 23 Historically, airlines have
not been very profitable and, in order to run their businesses,
have regularly incurred major expenses with regard to purchas-
ing aircraft, engines, maintenance, and fuel. 2 4 Because deregu-
lation subjected the airlines to market forces, airlines had to
find new ways to finance their fleets in a manner flexible
200 Robson, supra note 133, at 18. See also Airlines I01-A Pimer for Dummies,
supra note 160, at 1.
201 Robson, supra note 133, at 17-18.
202 Id. at 17, 19-20.
203 Id. at 17-18, 20.
204 Airlines 101-A Primer for Dummies, supra note 160, at 22. From 1963 to
1998, "the net profit margin for the world's airlines was 0.3%." Id.
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enough to endure the financial fluctuations caused by the mar-
ket's cyclical nature. 20 5
Fleet flexibility can be obtained and capital commitment can
be lowered through a lease. When airlines cannot generate
enough cash flow to support spending, spending has to be re-
duced. Airlines, in fact, reduced their spending in the early
1990s. 20 6 Consequently, a new financing tool emerged that min-
imized the emphasis on the credit of the airline: the operating
lease. In terms of aircraft, the operating lease did not exist until
the mid 1980s.2 °v Operating leases are attractive because they
provide airlines more fleet flexibility, decrease their capital ex-
penditures, and reduce their exposure to an aircraft's residual
value risk.208 Operating leases also make it possible for airlines
to continuously update their fleets by acquiring newer aircraft
models at significantly lower costs. 20 9 Accordingly, operating
leases have become increasingly important to the commercial
aviation market.
According to a recent article, "[t]he proportion of the global
fleet under operating lease has increased from 17 per cent in
1990 to 30 per cent in 2006. "121 ° Today, that number remains at
about one-third of all aircraft.21' Notwithstanding the current
market conditions characterized by record-high oil prices, a de-
clining housing market, and the tightening of credit, the de-
205 See Hinton, supra note 198 (discussing the benefits of leasing for airlines in
such a market).
206 Airlines 101--A Primer for Dummies, supra note 160, at 23.
207 Id.
208 Aircastle Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
h ttp: //quote.morningstar.com/stock-filing/Annual-Report/2007/ 12/31/ t.aspx?
t=AYR&ft=10-K&d=1699a96098d4f527.
209 Hinton, supra note 198.
210 Lessors Riding out the Storm, supra note 40, at 44. See also Alasdair Whyte,
What a Difference 10 Years Makes, AIRCRAFr ECONOMICS, No. 62 (Mar.-Apr. 2002), at
10.
211 Hinton, supra note 198. See also Hugh Tomlinson, Leasing Market Takes Off
MEED MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST,July 11, 2008 ("[A]s the rising cost of fuel
deters airlines from buying new planes and makes older, less fuel-efficient aircraft
too expensive to operate, leasing firms are enjoying a boom."). This demand will
"be driven by emerging economies in China and India" and the fact that supply is
limited with few aircraft available from Airbus and Boeing. Aircraft Leasing Firm
Sees Strong Demand to 2008, REUTERS, June 8, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSN0835917720070608.
2009] 883
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
mand for aircraft remains strong.212 In fact, "the number of
leased aircraft is expected to rise .. .to 40% by 2013 .... 23
While the operating lease market has greatly expanded over
the past fifteen years, leasing companies have developed, grown,
and changed in correspondingly significant ways. The aviation
finance marketplace has responded to the massive growth and
demand for lease financing by creating today's leasing company.
An analysis of a typical leasing company in today's market dem-
onstrates that the leasing company supplies a significant num-
ber of aircraft to the market but remains a small organization.214
Thus, on an asset allocation basis, most of the leasing company's
assets are dedicated to acquiring, marketing, and remarketing
its aircraft, and a relatively small portion of the company's assets
are dedicated to activities that would be considered elements of
such company's possession or control of its aircraft, such as tech-
nical support or repair and maintenance of aircraft.2 1 5 In short,
today's lessors do not operate, maintain, or otherwise possess or
control their aircraft. Indeed, lessors function as financiers pro-
viding financial support to airlines in the form of an available
supply of aircraft.
B. TYPES OF LEASING COMPANIES AND LESSOR CONTROL OVER
THEIR AIRCRAFr
2 16
Aircraft leasing has become a market in which substantial fi-
nancial opportunities exist. With so much economic opportu-
nity existing in the marketplace, many financial institutions
entered the market with hopes of generating income. Conse-
quently, aircraft lessors exist as a variety of corporate entities
such as commercial banks, hedge funds, and corporations.
Essentially, there are three different categories of aircraft les-
sors. First, many lessors, such as GE Capital Aviation Services
212 See, e.g., Dealwatch, AIRFINANCE JOURNAL Vol. 312,July/Aug. 2008 (giving sta-
tistics that 37 aircraft were acquired in just the months of April, May, and June of
2008).
213 Hinton, supra note 198.
214 See Aircastle Ltd., supra note 208, at 9 (noting that the business is "capital
intensive, rather than . . .labor intensive").
215 See id. at 43 (noting that "the lessee is generally responsible for maintaining
the aircraft and paying operational and insurance costs").
216 Note that certain information provided in this part, including technical
data and certain policies, has been provided by interviews with various leasing
company executives who have asked that such information remain confidential.




(GECAS), International Lease Finance Corporation (ILFC), and
BOC Aviation, are the creation of strong corporate parents or
sovereign wealth funds.217 Second, aircraft lessors such as Aer-
Cap, AirCastle, Genesis Lease Limited, and Babcock & Brown
Limited are publicly owned and traded independent companies.
Third, privately-owned lessors also exist in the market.
No matter the size of the lessor, lessors have certain common
and consistent features, all of which evidence entities that func-
tion as passive financiers, not as "hands-on" lessors who exert
control over their aircraft or the operations thereof. All lessors
are staffed in a manner that allows them to properly manage
financial assets but are without sufficient technical staffs to ac-
tively manage the maintenance and operation of their aircraft.
Moreover, while all lessors have standard leases that are under-
standably asset-focused, containing robust provisions regarding
the standards to which the operator must maintain, repair, and
operate the aircraft, lessors only monitor their lessees' perform-
ance of their obligations. A careful reading of the various lease
provisions indeed indicates that such provisions give the lessors
only rights of observation, not of performance.2 1 Furthermore,
lessors readily confirm that their technical staffs are not suffi-
cient, in either size or training, to do more than monitor their
lessees' performance.2 19
Currently, GECAS and ILFC are the two largest lessors of
commercial aircraft.22 GECAS owns and manages over 1,800
commercial aircraft,22 1 and ILFC owns nearly 1,000 commercial
aircraft. 222 Mid-sized aircraft lessors follow the capital-intensive
structures of GECAS and ILFC. Aircastle Limited and Genesis
Lease Limited are two mid-sized aircraft lessors that exemplify
the capital-intensive model. Aircastle Limited has 133 aircraft
217 ILFC is owned by American International Group, Inc. (AIG), and Bank of
China (BOC) acquired Singapore Aircraft Leasing Enterprise (SALE) in 2006.
Bank of China Acquires Singapore Aircraft Leasing Enterprise, BANK OF CHINA, Dec. 15,
2006, http://www.bankofchina.com/en/bocinfo/bil/200810/t20081027_8134.
html?keywords=bank+of+china+acquires+singapore+aircraft.
218 Vedder Price represents various entities in the aviation finance market
place. This statement is based on our review of the leases used by our clients.
219 See, e.g., Aircastle Ltd., supra note 208, at 9 ("We operate in a capital inten-
sive, rather than a labor intensive, business.").
220 Hinton, supra note 198.
221 GE Capital Aviation Services, http://www.gecas.com (last visited Oct. 6,
2009).
222 Introduction, International Lease Finance Corporation, http://v.ilfc.
com/introduction.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
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leased to 58 lessees in 31 countries. 223 However, Aircastle's staff
consists of only 69 employees. 224 Similarly, Genesis Lease Lim-
ited has 53 aircraft leased to 34 lessees in 17 countries.225 Gene-
sis also is slimly staffed with only 20 employees. 226 Clearly if
large and mid-sized leasing companies employ limited technical
staffs, private leasing companies' staffs are even smaller. One
private lessor reports only 20 staff members, 3 of which are con-
sidered technical personnel.227
In the case of all sizes of lessors, their technical staffs are a
small portion of their overall staffs, and the lessors' full staffs are
small relative to the number of aircraft they own. No matter the
type or size of the lessor, staffs of such a small number undoubt-
edly are not intended to repair and maintain aircraft. 228 Rather,
the staffing levels reflect what is appropriate for leasing compa-
nies who are not aircraft operators and who practice a business
model where aircraft are continuously leased and rarely sit in
the lessor's actual possession. 229 This not only maximizes a leas-
ing company's profits, but also minimizes the operator's capital
costs. When maintenance is needed on an aircraft that is in the
lessor's possession, the maintenance work is almost always con-
tracted out to other organizations. 230 However, this is a rare oc-
currence and usually exists when the lessee did not satisfy the
lease return provisions. Again, given the limited size of these
lessors' staff versus the number of aircraft owned and volume of
business generated, it is clear that they exist to manage the com-
223 Aircastle Ltd., supra note 208, at 42.
224 Id. at 9.
225 Genesis Lease Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at Introduction (Mar. 10,
2008), available at http://quote.morningstar.com/stock-filing/Annual-Report/
2007/12/31/t.aspx?t=GLS&ft=&d=cc68879058232967.
226 Id.
227 This company also reports that they do not manage their leased aircraft any
differently than their mortgaged aircraft.
228 As will be discussed in more detail later in this part, certain lessors rely fully
on their lessees to properly maintain and operate their aircraft during the terms
of their leases and their technical staffs are used only for deliveries, returns, and
lease defaults. Moreover, even the lessors that take some interest in how their
lessees are maintaining and operating their aircraft during the lease terms do so
on a very limited and only observational basis.
229 Even when lessors take possession of aircraft, they store the aircraft with
third party storage facilities and the only maintenance is storage upkeep, which is
minimal and provided by the storage facility.




pany's financial interest in its leased aircraft, not to operate,
maintain, possess, or control such aircraft.231
In addition to understanding how leasing companies are
structured, it is important to clarify various provisions in a typi-
cal lease that can also be the cause of misconceptions as to a
lessor's ability to exert control over its aircraft. In an aircraft
lease, there are provisions that, if read in isolation or without
considering the structure of the lessor, appear to give a lessor
significant control over its leased aircraft. However, when these
provisions are read carefully, and in the context of the structure
of today's lessor, they do not impart possession or control to a
typical lessor.
As an example of such a provision, leases generally contain
provisions stating that the lessee may be required to return the
aircraft or that the aircraft could be repossessed in the occur-
rence of an event of default as defined by the lease.232 This right
of possession only triggers upon default and does not give the
lessor any control over the aircraft in any other circumstances.
Moreover, these rights to repossession as articulated in the lease
put the lessor in the strongest position possible to repossess the
aircraft, but may be of little practical value. A lessor may have
difficulty repossessing an aircraft if the lessee does not cooper-
ate. In this event, a lessor will need a court order, which can
take some time to obtain. Furthermore, in many jurisdictions,
courts may be unable (e.g., because of bankruptcy laws) or un-
willing (because of a desire to give the airline business breathing
space to survive) to act quickly to order the return of an aircraft
to an operating lessor even when the airline is in clear breach of
its obligations. In these respects, lessors are in exactly the same
position as lenders.
Other provisions that may cause confusion, and which did so
in the Layug case, are various powers of attorney.2 3 Since a les-
sor retains an insurable interest in the aircraft, mandatory insur-
ance provisions for the benefit of the lessor, including power of
attorney privileges, are common in leases and in financing ar-
rangements. 234 In the Layug decision, the court misinterpreted
the power of attorney clause to mean that the lessor retained
control over the aircraft.235 This interpretation was incorrect,
231 See supra note 216.
232 See supra note 218.
233 See supra note 31.
234 See supra note 218.
235 See supra note 31 (detailing the lease provision in question).
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and these provisions do not provide lessors enough control over
the aircraft to preclude them from claiming protection under
§ 44112.
Also common are deregistration powers of attorney pursuant
to which a lessee gives a lessor the power to execute documents
in the name of the lessee in order to deregister an aircraft from
the relevant country's aircraft registry. 236 The lessor can use
such a power of attorney only when a lessor must repossess and
export an aircraft due to a lessee's default under the lease.23 7 A
deregistration power of attorney does not evidence a lessor's
control over the aircraft during the lease term, but simply per-
mits a lessor to take the necessary action to properly protect its
position by repossessing its aircraft upon default.238 Moreover, a
deregistration power of attorney is limited by the laws of the
country in which the aircraft is registered. Certain countries
have legal systems that do not provide for the concept of self-
help remedies and may not honor deregistration powers of
attorney.23 9
Maintenance provisions can also give the illusion of control.
In fact, no other provision in a lease relates more directly to the
possession and control of an aircraft than the provisions that
govern how an aircraft is to be maintained and operated.24 ° In
both the typical long-term aircraft finance lease and operating
lease, it is clear that the responsibility for maintenance and the
condition of the aircraft shifts to the lessee. Lessors have inspec-
tion rights that are generally extremely limited such that the les-
sors cannot interfere with the lessees' maintenance activities.
Certain lessors will not even exercise their inspection rights dur-
ing the lease terms, choosing instead to rely fully on the lessees
(and the local aviation authorities' supervision) to properly
maintain their aircraft. Furthermore, even the lessors that in-
spect will usually do so only when the aircraft is undergoing
heavy maintenance, which only happens approximately once
236 Julian Reddyhough, Asset Finance, May 20, 2003, http://www.securitization.
net/international/article.asp?id=485&aid=2688.
237 Id.
238 See, e.g., UNIDROIT, PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL IN-
TERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT,
(2001), http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/air-
craftprotocol.pdf (including form of deregistration power of attorney as annex).
239 See id. (addressing "[d]efault remedies, priorities and assignments" in Chap-
ter II).
240 See supra note 218.
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every fifteen months.241 These lessors readily confirm that their
inspection rights cannot interfere with the lessees' ongoing
maintenance and have no expectations of influencing the les-
sees' planned maintenance. The lessees' maintenance is dic-
tated by their maintenance programs, which are approved by
the local aviation authorities. As long as the lessees are in com-
pliance with the maintenance programs, the lessors have no
rights or ability to change anything the lessees are, or are not,
doing.
Lessors' rights go beyond inspection, to approval, only in spe-
cific circumstances where lessors have more invested in the con-
dition of the aircraft. The lessor relies on the condition of the
aircraft because it typically plans on leasing its aircraft to an-
other operator when the term of the lease expires. Mainte-
nance provisions requiring that lessors approve maintenance
workscopes and pay for a portion of the cost of such mainte-
nance, typically based on amounts previously paid by the lessee
to the lessor (referred to as "maintenance reserves" or "supple-
mental maintenance rent"), are not intended to put the lessor
in control of the aircraft's maintenance, but simply to ensure
that adequate funds will be available to pay for specified mainte-
nance procedures that the lessee is obligated to perform.242 In
discussing maintenance provisions, lessors regularly maintain
that the purpose of the approval rights is merely to ensure that
the work being performed is eligible for reimbursement and
that lessors rarely suggest changes to the workscope.243 As noted
above, the lessors readily acknowledge that they have no ability
to suggest such changes, or to otherwise influence the lessees'
maintenance, as long as the lessees are in compliance with their
maintenance programs.244 Consequently, the approval process
merely means that the lessors are verifying that the workscopes
are consistent with, and satisfy the requirements of, the mainte-
nance programs and the local aviation authorities'
requirements.
241 Airlines 101-A Primer for Dummies, supra note 160, at 29. These inspections
are known as "C checks," while heavy maintenance inspections, also called "D
checks," occur every six to eight years. Id.
242 STANDARD & POOR'S STRUCTURED FINANCE, AIRCRAFT SECURITIZATION CRITE-
RIA, 65-66, New York (1999), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/
spf/pdf/fixedincome/CriteriaBooklO.pdf.
243 See supra note 216.
244 See supra Part JV.B.
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When analyzing whether certain provisions in a lease, such as
powers of attorney or provisions relating to maintenance or in-
spection, give a lessor any rights that could effectively give the
lessor possession or control of an aircraft, it is instructive to con-
sider that virtually all leases have "quiet enjoyment" provi-
sions.2 " This provision provides that, so long as the lessee is not
in default, the lessor cannot in any way interfere with the
lessee's operation of the aircraft. Given such a restriction on the
lessor, it is difficult to see how a lessor could affect any element
of possession or control over the aircraft.
Understanding the development of leases, the types of lessors,
and their structures demonstrates how little control lessors have
over their own aircraft. It is important to note that the little
amount of control is not because, as the press after the Layug
case suggested, lessors have no concern for the aircraft, but be-
cause those responsibilities are given to the operator when the
aircraft is on lease. 246 Thus, it is clear that Congress intended
that lessors be shielded from liability. Congress's desire is to fa-
cilitate financing of aircraft so that they are available in the mar-
ketplace and to protect parties not in control of an aircraft from
liability.247 To honor Congress's intent, the initial guideline
must be that all lessors are protected by § 44112 for the two
main reasons we have touched upon in this section. First, les-
sors are financiers. This is true even in the event of an operat-
ing lessor because the lessor is affording an airline or other
lessee the opportunity to acquire an aircraft for the time that it
needs it. Second, lessors do not participate in the maintenance
or operation of their aircraft and thus have no control over their
aircraft. Lease provisions that appear to be an exercise of con-
trol, when more closely read, generally are not. To the extent
that there is a question as to whether a lessor's role in a transac-
tion could create circumstances where a lessor should face liabil-
ity, the statute already requires that in order for a lessor to be
protected, the lessor must have no control over the aircraft.
Thus, the exceptional lessors that do exercise control over an
aircraft would be excluded from protection. The important
245 See supra note 218.
246 See supra Part I.B (detailing press releases by the Layug plaintiffs' attorneys).
Likewise, lessors should not bear the burden of regulating aircraft on lease to
various lessees in various countries. The industry already has sufficient oversight
in the form of aviation authorities whose responsibility is not complicated by
commercial considerations.
247 See supra Part III.
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point to realize is that those exceptions can be found only by a
court's independent analysis on the "possession or control" ele-
ment-something that has been missing from the courts'
holdings.
C. ANALYZING THE ELEMENT OF "ACTUAL POSSESSION
OR CONTROL"
In addition to confusion over preemption and whether cer-
tain types of lessors or owners are covered under § 44112, rele-
vant case law also demonstrates that courts are unwilling, or
unable, to evaluate the element of "actual possession or control"
of an aircraft by a party. In reviewing the § 44112 case law, there
seems to be subtext indicating many courts are uncomfortable
with the potentially broad scope of the preemption, which has
caused such courts to seek exceptions and exclusions. 248 It is
hard to imagine that Congress was not concerned with creating
an overbroad exemption. Thus, the logical question is what did
Congress do to provide an appropriate scope for preemption.
The answer is that Congress did limit the scope of preemption
by providing that the preemption applies only where the party
seeking protection did not have "actual possession or con-
trol. '249 Consequently, once a defendant asserts § 44112 as pro-
tection from liability and is deemed an owner, lessor, or secured
party, the next step should be to evaluate that party's level of
possession or control over the aircraft. It is at this second step
that lessors or owners may be excluded from protection, de-
pending on their role in the transaction. If applied properly,
the analysis of "possession or control" should create appropriate
limits to the protections under § 44112.
In order to evaluate the issue of possession and control, it is
important to understand the varying levels of control lessors and
owners have in different transactions. Distinguishing between
secured parties, owners, and lessors without an evaluation as to
such party's level of control over an aircraft misses the clear
meaning, as well as the intent, of § 44112. Like secured parties,
some lessors simply retain a contractual right to repossess an air-
craft in the event of a default of the operator's obligations
under the lease, with no other amount of possession or control
over the aircraft. The same applies to true lessors, who, though
they hold title and get the aircraft back at the end of the lease
248 See supra Part II.A.
249 See 49 U.S.C. § 44112(b) (2006).
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term, maintain no control over the aircraft during the term of
the lease and rarely, if ever, see the aircraft from the day it is
delivered to the day it is returned. 5 ° Other lessors have express
contractual rights giving them more control over their air-
craft.2 5 1 This type of "hands-on" lessor may have an element of
control over the aircraft and perhaps should be excluded from
protection under the statute.
It is hard to argue that a lessor should be excluded from the
protection of § 44112 simply because it gets its aircraft back at
the end of the lease or because the lease provides appropriate
protections in the event that the lessee is not performing the
lessee's obligations under the lease. Whether a defendant is
covered by the statute should not be based on a classification of
that defendant as a secured party versus an owner or lessor
when § 44112 is meant to protect all three categories and Con-
gress has provided an express standard for determining liability
based on possession or control.252 Unfortunately, courts are not
understanding or applying "possession or control" in their
decisions.
It is interesting to review the cases with regard to possession
and control to determine what courts are missing. For example,
the defendant in Retzler, AMR, was a corporate affiliate of the
operator;253 thus, it could be argued that the defendant ulti-
mately controlled the aircraft through corporate interrelation-
ships. However, the Retzler court never considered the issue of
control.
Similarly, in Inlow, the aircraft was operated by a sublessee,
Conseco, Inc.254  Conseco Investment Holding Company
(CIHC), which owned Conseco, Inc., was the sublessor and was
leasing the aircraft from General Electric Capital Corporation
for financing purposes.255 The Inlow court held that because the
250 See STANDARD & POOR'S STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 242, at 65-66
("Most operating leases provide that the lessee is liable for all maintenance costs
which may arise. In the event that an aircraft is forcibly repossessed following for
example a rental payment default by the airline, the aircraft may require some
outstanding maintenance work before it is in a condition to be re-leased or sold
to another airline.").
251 See Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos. X07CV044001467S & X07CV0440
03418S, 2005 WL 3624483, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005).
252 See 49 U.S.C. § 44112.
253 Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 723 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
254 In re Lawrence W. Inlow Accident Litig., No. IP 99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL
331625, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001).
255 Id. at *1, *8.
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aircraft was subject to a lease of more than thirty days, CIHC was
a lessor and thus, could not be held liable under § 44112.256
However, the lease from CIHC to Conseco, Inc. was seemingly
for tax purposes257 and thus, again, it could be argued that
CIHC had control over the aircraft. Yet again, the court did not
analyze true ownership structure and the amount of control
held by the lessor.
It is clear based on these decisions that courts need guidance
on how to apply facts when addressing whether a particular air-
craft financier is "in possession or control." There are complex
issues relating to exempting lessors from protection under
§ 44112 based on differentiating between different types of own-
ers and lessors and on fully understanding lease transactions. A
history of leasing, as well as a better general understanding of
leasing transactions, is necessary for courts to correctly evaluate
the cases.
With lawsuits continuing, it is important to address the issues
highlighted by the Layug case and related case law. To do this
and to put the issues this article has analyzed into perspective, it
is necessary to have a general understanding of the industry and
how modern transactions are structured. The next part de-
scribes leasing in the context of today's aviation-finance market
in order to provide a basis for clarifying § 44112 to alleviate the
current divergent and troubling case law, as well as honoring
Congress's initial intent in enacting § 44112.
V. ADDRESSING THE ISSUES
The large and unexpected settlement in Layug has left the avi-
ation-finance industry (in particular, lessors) in fear of further
litigation resulting from the operation of aircraft completely out
of their control. This fear could potentially lead to an unwilling-
ness of both financiers and insurers to continue to participate in
the market. While there does exist some well-reasoned case law
on point, preemption of state-law claims is not clear precedent.
Thus, it is imperative that the statute be revised to more clearly
convey its purpose to preempt claims available under state law.
Additionally, the analysis of the case law also demonstrates
further confusion on the separate issue of whom § 44112 is
meant to protect. Despite the plain language of the statute and
256 Id. at *14, *18.
257 See id. at *7 (discussing "state tax benefits" associated with "holding certain
intangible assets in Delaware").
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the documented inclusion of lessors contained in the legislative
history, courts have erroneously held that lessors in certain, but
not clearly defined, transactions are not protected. This flaw
can lead to the same potential result-the unwillingness of les-
sors to participate in the market for fear of being subjected to
inordinate amounts of financial liability for aircraft that the les-
sor does not control or possess. A survey of the different types
of leases and lessors demonstrates that leasing transactions are
more complicated than courts seem to appreciate and also that
lessors generally have very little control over an aircraft.258
Based on a careful examination of today's leasing companies
and the provisions in a typical lease, it is clear that lessors should
be included in the protection of § 44112. Clarifying that lessors
are covered under § 44112 will further Congress's intent in
shielding lessors from liability without unfairly protecting lessors
that have possession or control over their aircraft. Accordingly,
the statute also must be revised to more definitively include all
lessors in the absence of possession or control.
In order to preserve lawsuits by sympathetic plaintiffs in cases
where § 44112's preemption otherwise would provide for dismis-
sal, courts have found ambiguities in the current statute, as well
as its legislative history, to argue against preemption, based on
either no preemption of state-law claims or no protection for
certain lessors. A thorough and logical review of § 44112, in-
cluding its predecessor statutes and the legislative history, pro-
vides compelling arguments that § 44112 both preempts state-
law claims and protects lessors. The logical conclusion to such
analysis, therefore, is to amend § 44112 to eliminate the ambigu-
ities that have allowed courts to issue contrary rulings.
A. REVISING THE STATUTE
The confusion and inconsistent precedent that exists with re-
spect to the issues discussed throughout this article should be
addressed by an amendment to § 44112. An appropriate
amendment would alleviate lessors' and owners' fears of being
subjected to liability for an aircraft on lease and out of their
possession and control. Otherwise, the original intent of the
statute, to facilitate the availability of aircraft,259 will be in jeop-
ardy. As in the case of the first revision to the statute that in-
258 See supra Part 1V.B.
259 See H.R. REP. No. 80-2091 (1948), rrinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836, 1836
and text accompanying supra note 107.
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cluded engine lessors to alleviate their fear of liability,260 it is
time for another revision to clearly set forth the elements of the
statute, the parties within its purview, and its intention to pre-
empt state law. Thus, this article proposes revising the statute as
follows:
§ 44112. Limitation of liability
(a) Definitions. In this section:
(1) "actual possession" means that the aircraft, engine, or pro-
peller is in the physical custody of the lessor, owner, or secured
party at the time of the incident.
(2) "control" means that the lessor, owner, or secured party
has responsibility for initiating and conducting or terminating
a flight.
(3) "lessor" means a person leasing for at least 30 days a civil
aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller.
(4) "owner" means a person who owns a civil aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller.
(5) "secured party" means a person having a security interest
in, or security title to, a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propel-
ler under a conditional sales contract, equipment trust con-
tract, chattel or corporate mortgage, or similar instrument.
(b) Liability. A lessor, owner, or secured party is NOT liable for
personal injury, death, or property loss or damage THAT OCCURS
on land, IN THE AIR,2 6 1 or ON water, UNDER ANY FEDERAL OR STATE-
LAw CLAim, except when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propel-
ler is in the actual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or
secured party, and the personal injury, death, or property loss or
damage occurs because of:
(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or
260 See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 482, sec. 401, § 504, 62 Stat. 470, 470
(1948) and text accompanying supra notes 125-26.
261 The minor addition of "in the air" is in response to the case of Stoie v.
Southfield Leasing, Inc., where, reluctant to make a determination over whether
§ 1404 was intended to preempt state-law claims, the court made a troublesome
distinction. The court opined that because the federal statute applied to injuries
"on land or on water," the plaintiffs claim under a Michigan statute (which im-
posed liability upon aircraft owners for injuries suffered inside the aircraft) was
not preempted. Storie v. Southfield Leasing, Inc. 282 N.W.2d 417, 420-21
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979). The court stated,
A close reading of 49 U.S.C. § 1404 leads us to conclude, however,
that the Federal statute is inapplicable to the situation .... [T]he
injury occurred inside the aircraft and not upon the surface of the
earth. We do not read 49 U.S.C. § 1404 as preventing the states
from imposing liability upon the owners of airplanes in these
circumstances.
Id. at 421.
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(2) the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine,
or propeller.
As to preemption, the above editing changes the provision so
that it states that lessors, owners, or secured parties are not liable
except in the given circumstance of being in possession or con-
trol of the aircraft. This takes the emphasis from the positive
(lessors are liable) to the negative (lessors are not liable) and
then lists the exception and, consequently, more clearly focuses
the interpreting court's attention to the fact that lessors, owners,
and secured parties are generally not liable. The second
change, the addition of "under any federal or state-law claim"
will clarify to courts that § 44112 is intended to preempt all rem-
edies available under either federal or state law when the re-
quirements of the statute have been met.
As to the inclusion of lessors, the existence of three separate
parties is already evident in the statute,26 2 but since there remain
divergent opinions by the courts, any proposal for a revision to
§ 44112 should clarify that the exemption from liability is availa-
ble to all three categories. Consequently, when a subsequent
court reviews the legislative history, Congress's intent to protect
all three parties will be clearer than it exists in the legislative
history now.
Providing guidelines regarding "actual possession and con-
trol" will assist courts in evaluating who was ultimately responsi-
ble for the aircraft and thus who should be subject to liability.
Drawing attention to this requirement may lessen the possibility
that the court will skip over an analysis of this element
altogether.
These suggested changes will clarify the confusion caused by
current court decisions, update § 44112 to conform to the reali-
ties of the current leasing market, and protect Congress's origi-
nal intention to facilitate aircraft availability. In 1948, Congress
enacted a limitation on liability to protect the parties that supply
available aircraft to the marketplace when those parties do not
have actual control over the aircraft. Current case law threatens
to disrupt Congress's original intent. It is time to ensure that its
intent is properly preserved.
262 See 49 U.S.C. § 44112(a) (2006) (defining "lessor," "owner," and "secured
party").
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